Differential merger effects: the case of the personal computer industry by Genakos, Christos D.
DIFFERENTIAL MERGER EFFECTS: 
The Case of the Personal Computer Industry 
 
Christos D. Genakos* 
London Business School and 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
Contents: 
 
Abstract 
1. Introduction 
2. The Personal Computer Industry 
3. The Empirical Framework 
4. Data and Estimation 
5. Results 
6. Conclusion  
Appendix 
References 
Figures 
Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion paper  
No. EI/37 December 2004 
The Toyota Centre 
Suntory and Toyota International Centres for 
Economics and Related Disciplines 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
Tel: (020) 7955 6674 
 
______________________________________________________________ 
* I am indebted to my supervisor Prof. Paul Geroski for his constructive 
comments and continuous support. I also wish to thank Peter Davis, Wouter 
Denhaan, Konstantinos Metaxoglou, Marco Ottaviani, Mario Pagliero, Elias 
Papaioannou, Mark Schankerman, Gregorios Siourounis and John VanReenen 
for constructive discussions and suggestions. I am also grateful to James O'Brien 
from IDC for his help with the data. Financial support from the LBS and ESRC is 
gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are my own.  
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines how information on the purchasing patterns of different 
customer segments can be used to more accurately evaluate the economic 
impact of mergers. Using a detailed dataset for the leading manufacturers in the 
US during the late nineties, I evaluate the welfare effects of the biggest ($25 
billion) merger in the history of the PC industry between Hewlett-Packard and 
Compaq. I follow a two-step empirical strategy. In the first step, I estimate a 
demand system employing a random coefficients discrete choice model. In the 
second step, I simulate the postmerger oligopolistic equilibrium and compute the 
welfare effects. I extend previous research by analysing the merger effects not 
only for the whole market but also for three customer segments (home, small 
business and large business). Results from the demand estimation and merger 
analysis reveal that: (i) the random coefficients model provides a more realistic 
market picture than simpler models, (ii) despite being the world's second and 
third largest PC manufacturers, the merged HP-Compaq entity would not raise 
postmerger prices significantly, (iii) there is considerable heterogeneity in 
preferences across segments that persists over time, and (iv) the merger effects 
differ considerably across segments. 
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1 Introduction
Merger activity has witnessed an unprecedented increase over the last decade, both in
terms of monetary value and number of deals involved.1 The number of mergers reviewed
by US regulators in 1998, for example, was 4,728 (compared to 3,702 in 1997 and 1,451 in
1991) with a total merger value that exceeded $1 trillion.2 Theory suggests that a merger
between competitors increases rmsmarket power (both for the merged entity and its
competitors), thereby leading to higher prices and lower output (absent any o¤setting
e¢ ciency gain).3 Antitrust authorities, therefore, actively seek to prevent mergers that
could threaten competition. The extent to which prices rise, however, is an empirical
question. Moreover, the e¤ect on total welfare is ambiguous and theoretical work cannot,
by itself, answer this question. The purpose of this paper is to examine how information
on the purchasing patterns of di¤erent customer segments can be used to more accurately
evaluate the economic impact of mergers.
I evaluate the welfare e¤ects of the biggest ($25 billion) merger in the history of the
personal computer (PC) industry between Hewlett-Packard (HP) and Compaq. I also
examine a second hypothetical merger between the two largest rms in the industry, Dell
and Compaq. Using a detailed dataset for the leading PC manufacturers in the US during
the late nineties, I extend previous research by analysing the merger e¤ects not only for
the whole market but also for three customer segments (home, small business and large
business). The existence of customer groups with di¤erent purchasing patterns, although
recognised in other markets (e.g., tourist vs. business travelers in the airline industry;
Berry, Carnall and Spiller, 1997), has never been incorporated in a merger analysis.
Merger evaluation is based on a two-step empirical strategy, rst proposed by Baker
and Bresnahan (1985) and developed further by Berry and Pakes (1993), Hausman,
Leonard and Zona (1994) and Nevo (2000a). First, I estimate a structural demand sys-
tem employing a random coe¢ cients discrete choice model (McFadden, 1973; Boyd and
Mellman (1980); Cardell and Dunbar (1980); Berry, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes,
1995 (henceforth BLP); Nevo, 2001). Demand is estimated both for the whole market and
for each of the three customer segments. The resulting estimates, in conjuction with a
Nash-Bertrand equilibrium assumption, are used to recover estimates of the prot margins
and marginal costs for each PC producer. Second, I simulate the postmerger equilibrium
prices under various assumptions at three points in time. I compare the welfare e¤ects of
these mergers across time and segments.
Results from the demand estimation and merger analysis reveal that: (i) the random
coe¢ cients model provides a more realistic picture of the market than simpler models,
(ii) the demand specication is found to be robust to various perturbations. This sample
counters recent criticisms that a random coe¢ cients model either over-estimates (Goeree,
2004) or under-estimates (Ackerberg and Rysman, 2004) elasticities. (iii) despite being
the worlds second and third largest PC manufacturers, the merged HP-Compaq entity
would not raise postmerger prices signicantly, (iv) there is considerable heterogeneity in
preferences across segments that persists over time, and (v) the merger e¤ects vary con-
1For a recent review on merger activity, see Andrade, Mitchell and Sta¤ord (2001).
2Business Week, March 23, 1998, p.35 and Romeo (1999).
3For a recent review on the theory of unilateral e¤ects, see Ivaldi, Jullien, Rey, Seabright and Tirole
(2003).
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siderably across segments. Evidence from the HP-Compaq merger in 2001, for example,
suggests that an attempt from the merged entity to take advantage of its full product line
would result in negative prots in the home and small business segments, with more than
compensating gains from the large business segment. Moreover, the merger would harm
home consumers more than business buyers. Hence, this cross-sectional analysis not only
provides rms with a more accurate picture of the merger, but also allows competition
authorities to evaluate the merger more e¤ectively given the knowledge of its di¤erential
welfare implications.
This paper contributes to a growing empirical literature on structural demand estima-
tion and horizontal merger analysis. Traditional methods of horizontal merger analysis,
that rely on concentration measures, provide a standard to evaluate the competitive ef-
fects of the merger only under strong assumptions. The nature of competition and the
large number of brands in di¤erentiated oligopolistic product markets render these con-
centration measures di¢ cult to use easily for policy recommendation.4 Recent advances
in structural methods that combine demand estimation with a game theoretic model of
the competitive market structure make merger simulations feasible for many industries.5
Structural empirical analysis of this market, however, poses many challenges due to the
large number of PCs available and the frequent introduction of new products and char-
acteristics.
Merger evaluation requires an accurate assessment of substitution possibilities. The
random coe¢ cients model has several advantages over alternative demand specications.
First, it allows for exible own-price elasticities to be driven by the price sensitivity of
di¤erent consumers and not by functional form assumptions as in the case of the logit
model. Second, it permits cross-price elasticities to depend on how close products are in
the characteristics space without imposing a priori product segmentation (Nested Logit,
Principles of Di¤erentiation Generalized Extreme Value) or a priori parameter restrictions
(market level linear or log-linear demand systems). Moreover, McFadden and Train (2000)
show such a model can approximate arbitrarily close any choice model.
The structural demand model results match market reality closely. Reported prot
margins for the top manufacturers vary from 10 to 20 percent, while estimated margins for
the whole market vary from 10.4 to 18.8 percent. Additionally, the demand specication
is robust to various perturbations. Goeree (2004) presents an empirical discrete choice
model where consumers have limited information with respect to available products. She
argues that models assuming full consumer awareness will be biased towards being too
elastic. In contrast, Ackerberg and Rysman (2004) argue that standard discrete choice
models under-predict elasticities. They suggest that this is due to these modelsfailure
to correct for the crowding of the unobserved characteristic space when new products are
introduced in the market. I nd no evidence in this sample that a random coe¢ cients
model either over-estimates or under-estimates elasticities. These results contribute to
4For example, the Hirshman/Herndal index (HHI) of concentration is a less reliable measure of market
power in an industry with di¤erentiated products. Markups can be high, when products are not close
substitutes, even in unconcentrated industries. Hence, merger e¤ects depend more on the substitution
pattern among products, than on their market shares.
5Examples include beer (Baker and Bresnahan, 1985; Hausman, Leonard and Zona, 1994; Pinkse and
Slade, 2004), automobiles (Berry and Pakes, 1993; Ivaldi and Verboven, 2004), long distance telecommu-
nications (Werden and Froeb, 1994), ready-to-eat cereals (Nevo, 2000a), carbonated soft drinks (Dube,
2004) and airlines (Peters, 2001).
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our knowledge for the performance of these models in di¤erentiated oligopolistic markets.
According to the merger simulations, absent any cost e¢ ciencies, the HP-Compaq deal
would result in a $1.06 million loss in consumer surplus in 2001 and a $11.7 million overall
welfare gain. This is empirical support for the merger approval by both the US Federal
Trade Commission and the European Competition Commission. Sti¤ price competition
and the high degree of substitutability among PC manufacturers meant that the merged
entitys transitory market power was not signicant to threaten competition in the late
nineties. Competitors such as Dell, Gateway and IBM would benet the most if HP-
Compaq were to raise postmerger prices.
The demand estimation also reveals considerable and persistant preference heterogene-
ity across the three segments. The European Competition Commissions report for the
HP-Compaq merger explicitly recognises that "because, among other elements, individual
consumers show di¤erent purchasing patterns,..., the market for PCs could be broken down
between consumers and commercial customers."6 The results not only validate the view
expressed by the European Competition Commission, but also indicate the di¤erential
responses of segments to any merger.7
Although results from the whole market for the HP-Compaq merger in 2001 indicate
that the combined rms protability would be positive, segment examination reveals
that: the merger would be unprotable for the home (-$0.5 million) and small business
(-$0.26 million) segments, with all the gains coming from the large business segment
($1.80 million). This illustrates the di¤erences in each segments underlying demand and
it seems to be close to reality. Hence, this cross-sectional analysis provides rms with a
more comprehensive picture of the merger that can also be used for strategic purposes.
This detailed analysis can also be valuable from the public policy perspective. Con-
sumer loss from the HP-Compaq merger is much higher for home than for business buyers.
This is not the case, however, for all mergers across time. The hypothetical Dell-Compaq
merger in 1998, for example, yields a negative consumer surplus, which is larger for the
large business than the other two segments. Overall welfare though is signicantly smaller
in the home than in the small or large business sectors. Knowledge of these di¤erential
e¤ects can provide regulators with valuable information for the assessment of the overall
impact of the proposed merger.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes those aspects of the
personal computer industry most relevant to the demand analysis. Section 3 discusses the
empirical framework to estimate demand, simulate the mergers and calculate the welfare
e¤ects. Section 4 describes the data and estimation details. Section 5 presents results.
The rst subsection analyses the demand estimates. The second subsection examines
the sensitivity of the demand specication and the third subsection presents the merger
analysis. The nal section concludes.
6Case No COMP/M. 2609-HP/COMPAQ, O¢ ce for O¢ cial Publications of the European Communi-
ties.
7Further consequences of this nding, related to the interaction between the PC and server markets
are explored in Genakos, Kühn and Van Reenen (2004).
3
2 The Personal Computer Industry
Technical change in personal computing has occurred at an extremely fast pace throughout
its history. Competition, however, has changed radically in the late nineties from the
period when the rst IBM PC was introduced.8 Three important aspects of the personal
computer industrys evolution are relevant to the demand analysis and the HP-Compaq
merger: the fast rate of technical innovation, the reduction in R&D expenditures of PC
manufacturers and the proliferation of di¤erentiated products.
The early emergence of the IBM PC platform9 played a prominent evolutionary role. It
served as a coordinating mechanism due to IBMs decision to use other rmstechnology in
key functions (most notably, Intel for the microprocessor and Microsoft for the operating
system) and to have an open architecture (i.e. any user could add non-IBM hardware and
software). This open architecture meant that platform components were interchangeable.
Consequently, all market participants could benet from the technological progress and
all had a focal point for their innovative e¤orts. In addition, this new architecture led to
the transition from the vertically integrated suppliers to an horizontal market structure
of vertically disintegrated specialized rms.10
Under the new horizontal structure, although various rms have dominant positions
in di¤erent layers, no single rm controls the platforms direction. This creates both erce
competition and continuous innovation at every layer. Figure 1 documents how quickly
the microprocessors11 quality evolved. Specically, the "benchmark"12 value of the best
available processor more than doubled within a year and increased more than sixteenfold
within six years. Similar patterns hold for the other essential PC components, such as
the RAM or hard disk.
At the same time, due to the vertical disintegration, PC manufacturers reduced their
R&D expenditures13 and concentrated on collecting the various parts of the nal product
from companies in di¤erent layers of the platform. Technical knowledge was not the crit-
ical advantage anymore. Assembly simplicity and ease of component purchasing, lowered
the entry barriers for potential new assemblers. As seen in Figure 2, this caused both a
surge of small producers (denoted as "Others") and the rise of the "Dell phenomenon".
Firms such as Dell or Gateway quickly established a strong market position by taking
advantage of the new industry structure.
8Langlois (1992) and Ste¤ens (1994) provide excellent historical reviews of the personal computer
industry and Breshnahan and Greenstein (1999) present an integrated analysis of the whole computer
industrys evolution.
9Following Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999), a computer platform can be dened as a "bundle of
standard components around which buyers and sellers coordinate e¤orts".
10That is what Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) called divided technical leadership, i.e. the supply
of key platform components by multiple rms.
11I will use the words microprocessor, processor or CPU interchangeably.
12CPU benchmarks were obtained from The CPU Scorecard (www.cpuscorecard.com). They are num-
bers assigned to each processor-speed combination based on technical and performance characteristics.
Bajari and Benkard (2004) were the rst to use this variable.
13"R&D spending by most PC manufaturers has declined over the past four years from an industry
average of just 4% of sales to about 2% of sales. In sharp contrast, Intel, the dominant supplier of
microprocessors to the PC industry, ploughed 8% of revenues, or $1.3bn, into R&D last year. Microsoft,
the leading PC software supplier, spent $890m on R&D last year, or 15% of its sales", Financial Times
(10/2/1996).
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PC variety also increased during the late nineties. First, the range of available quality
widened, as is evident from the increased di¤erence over time between the upper and
lower bound of "benchmark" values in Figure 1. Processor manufacturers, such as Intel,
looked for greater market segmentation through a larger range of vertically di¤erenti-
ated processors and a shortened average life cycle of each processor.14 Personal computer
manufacturers, in turn, amplied this phenomenon by o¤ering an ever increasing num-
ber of products that were not only di¤erent in their "basic" characteristics (such as the
microprocessor, RAM or speed) but also in other dimensions (CD-ROM, modem, DVD,
monitor size etc). Finally, the combination of fast technical innovation, numerous suc-
cessful entrants and increased product proliferation led to a continuous fall in PC prices.
Figure 3 illustrates both the increased product options and the decreasing prices. These
trends are not only important for the demand specication, but they also portray the
competitive environment in which HP and Compaq consolidate their forces.
3 The Empirical Framework
I follow a two-step empirical strategy to evaluate the mergers competitive e¤ects. In
the rst step, I estimate a structural model that describes the demand and supply con-
ditions in the personal computer industry. In the second step, I simulate the postmerger
oligopolistic equilibrium and compute the welfare e¤ects. The demand system15 is esti-
mated employing a random coe¢ cient discrete choice model similar to that of BLP. I then
use the resulting elasticities in combination with a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium assumption
to recover estimates of marginal costs and to simulate the merger.
3.1 Demand
The empirical model of demand is obtained by aggregating a discrete choice model of
individual consumer behavior. Each consumer is endowed with preferences over prod-
uct characteristics, rather than the products themselves (Lancaster (1971)). This solves
the dimensionality problem faced in a classical demand system, like that of Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980). Individual heterogeneity is modeled in a way that does not restrict
substitution patterns a priori, but allows elasticities between products to be driven by
how similar the products are in the characteristics space. This not only makes the model
more realistic, but also a¤ects subsequent calculations for the merger simulation.
The conditional indirect utility, uij (), of each consumer i = 1; :::; I for every product
j = 1; :::; J is assumed to be a function of observed and unobserved product characteristics,
individual characteristics and unknown parameters  = (1, 2). It takes the following
form:
(1) uij () = j (1) + ij (2) + ij  Vij + ij.
14Song (2003) documents the shortening of processor life cycles in the late nineties and Genakos (2004)
presents evidence of the same phenomenon in the PC market.
15For a recent review of the literature on demand models for di¤erentiated products, see Davis (2000).
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The rst term, j, is the mean utility derived from consuming good j, which is common
to all consumers. It is given by
(2) j = xj   pj + j,
where xj and  are vectors of the observed product characteristics and the associ-
ated taste parameters respectively,  is the marginal utility of income, pj is the price of
product j and j denotes utility derived from characteristics observed by the consumers
and the rms, but not the econometrician. Unobserved product characteristics include
unquantiable variables such as rm or brand reputation for reliability, prestige e¤ects or
after-sales service quality. Since these characteristics are observed by market participants,
they will be correlated with the equilibrium prices making the price coe¢ cient biased to-
wards zero. Instrumental variable techniques can not straighforwardly be applied, given
that both pj and j enter the market share equation in a nonlinear way. Berry (1994)
develops a general method that allows the use of instrumental variables to a large class
of discrete choice models.
The second term in (1), ij, represents a deviation from the mean utility. This is
individual specic and can be written as
(3) ij =
X
k
kxjkik + ppjip
where xjk is the kth characteristic of product j, for k = 1; :::; K and k, p are
unknown coe¢ cients. The vector i = (i1; :::; iK ; ip) represents each consumers K + 1
idiosyncratic tastes for the K observed characteristics and the associated price. It is
drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean and an identity covariance
matrix.16 Finally, ij denotes shocks that are identically and independently distributed
across products and consumers with a Type I extreme value distribution.17 Notice that ij
depends on the interaction of consumer specic preferences and product characteristics.
More precisely, each consumer i derives (k + kik)xk utility from every kth product
characteristic. BLP show that allowing for substitution patterns to depend on consumers
heterogeneous tastes (i.e. ij 6= 0) is crucial for realistic demand elasticities.18 For
example, consumers who attach a higher utility to laptop computers would more likely
substitute towards other laptops rather than desktops.
16The choice of this distribution is ad hoc. Although the multivariate normal is the most popular choice
(e.g., BLP; Nevo, 2000a, 2001), other possibilities have also been explored (e.g., Petrin, 2002). There is
no evidence that the choice of this assumption a¤ects the estimated coe¢ cients in any fundamental way.
17While this particular assumption facilitates estimation by insuring nonzero purchase probabilities
and smooth derivatives for the market share equation, it has recently been criticized. Petrin (2002), for
example, shows that welfare changes from the introduction of new products are overstated due to the
presence of this idiosyncatic error term. Alternative models, like the probit model of Goolsbee and Petrin
(2004), are prohibited for the current application given the large number of products in each period.
Finally, recent work by Berry and Pakes (2002) and Bajari and Benkard (2004) that remove the logit
error entirely, although promising, is still under development.
18When ij is zero, the only source of heterogeneity among consumers is based on the i.i.d. ijs. In
terms of elasticities, that implies that all the consumers have the same expected ranking over products.
In other words, consumers would substitute more towards the most popular products independently of
their characteristics and the characteristics of the products they bought previously.
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Introducing an "outside good" completes the demand specication. Consumers are
allowed to not purchase any of the personal computers o¤ered by these rms. Otherwise,
a uniform price increase would not change the quantities purchased. The indirect utility
of the outside option is
(4) ui0 = 0 + 0i0 + i0.
where the price of the outside good is normalized to zero. Since relative levels of utility
cannot be identied, the mean utility of one good has to be normalized to zero. As is
customary, I normalize 0 to zero. The term i0 accounts for the outside alternatives
unobserved variance. It implies that a random coe¢ cient exists on the constant term for
the inside goodsutility.
Each consumer is assumed to purchase one good per period19 from the available choice
set, which provides him with the highest utility. Given the assumption on the distribution
of ij, the probability that consumer i purchases good j is given by the multinomial logit
choice probability (McFadden, 1973)
(5) Pr (j j x; i) =
exp

j +
XK
k=1
kxjkik + ppjip

1 +
XJ
j=1
exp

j +
XK
k=1
kxjkik + ppjip

Market shares for each product, sj, are obtained by aggregating over consumers and
their vectors of unobservable tastes. This integral is solved numerically via aggregation
by simulation, using a technique introduced by Pakes (1986).
3.2 Supply and equilibrium
The supply side is structured in a way that approximates competition in the PC market.
Each of the F multiproduct rms has a portfolio,  f , of the j = 1; :::; J di¤erent products
in the PC market. The prot function of rm f can be expressed as
(6) f =
P
j2 f
(pj  mcj)Msj(p),
where sj(p) is the predicted market share of brand j, which depends on the prices of all
other brands, M is the market size and mcj is the constant marginal cost of production.
Assuming that there exists a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices20 and that
19Although this assumption seems reasonable for home or small business users, it might not be applica-
ble to the large business segment. Hendell (1999), for example, observes PC purchases of large rms and
models explicitly the choice of multiple products. However, without more dissagregate information his
techniques cannot be applied to the current data. Hence, if this phenomenon is widespread this model
can be seen as a rst approximation to the true choice model.
20Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) have shown that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists under fairly
general conditions, assuming single product rms. There are no theoretical papers that generalize their
results for multiproduct rms. I follow the empirical literature and assume its existence and uniqueness.
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all prices that support it are strictly positive, then the price pj of any product produced
by rm f must satisfy the rst-order condition
(7) sj(p) +
P
r2 f
(pr  mcr)@sr(p)
@pj
= 0
This system of J equations can be inverted to solve for the marginal costs. Dene
Sjr =  @sj(p)=@pr, j; r = 1; :::; J ,

jr =

1, if j and r are produced by the same rm,
0, otherwise,
and 
 a J  J matrix with 
jr = 
jr  Sjr. Then, given the product ownership
structure before the merger (
bm), marginal costs (in vector notation) are given by
(8) mc = p  
bm(p) 1s(p).
The markup vector in (8) depends only on the parameters of the demand system and
the equilibrium price vector. Therefore, by using the estimated demand parameters we
can compute estimates of price-cost margins and marginal costs without using actual
cost information. These calculations are based upon the demand coe¢ cientsconsistency
and the equilibrium assumption. For the merger simulation, I use the same equilibrium
assumption and the new (after merger) industry structure matrix 
am. The postmerger
equilibrium price vector, p, solves
(9) p = cmc+ 
am(p) 1s(p),
where cmc are the estimated marginal costs, based on the demand coe¢ cients and the
premerger ownership structure of the industry.
The estimated postmerger prices rely on several assumptions: First, the equilibrium
assumption remains the same before and after the merger. While, this needs to be ques-
tioned for every possible merger, there are no reasons to doubt its validity for the HP-
Compaq merger. Second, the marginal costs and the number of products are held constant
at their premerger level. However, this framework allows me to quantify claims that a
merger will have cost e¢ ciencies. As a counterfactual exercise, I calculate the necessary
cost e¢ ciencies that would leave the postmerger equilibrium prices unchanged and assess
their plausibility. Third, the postmerger elasticities are calculated based on premerger
data, which implicity assumes that consumer preferences and the outside goods value
remain constant after the merger. This assumption can be challenged since changes in
rmsstrategy within the industry or changes outside the industry could a¤ect both the
price sensitivity and the overall PC demand. Therefore, this analysis is more indicative
of the short rather than the long run response to the merger.
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3.3 Consumer Welfare
The structural models results are also used to calculate consumer welfare changes due
to the merger. I use compensating variation to calculate the dollar amount that would
leave a consumer indi¤erent before and after the merger. Assuming that the marginal
utility of income is xed, McFadden (1981) and Small and Rosen (1981) show that the
compensating variation of individual i is given by
(10) CVi =
ln
hXJ
j=0
exp
 
V amij
i  ln hXJ
j=0
exp
 
V bmij
i
i
where i =  + pip is the price coe¢ cient for each individual and V bmij and V
am
ij ,
as dened in (1), are computed using the premerger prices and postmerger predicted
prices, respectively. Aggregating over i and multiplying by the market size gives the
mean compensating variation. These calculations assume that both the value of the each
products unobserved characteristic, j, and the utility from the outside good remain
constant after the merger.
4 Data and Estimation
4.1 Data
The personal computer tracker (PC Tracker) is an industry census conducted by the
International Data Corporation (IDC). The PC Tracker gathers information from the
major vendors, component manufacturers and various channel distributors.21 It is one
of the best available datasources for the PC industry.22 I use quarterly information on
quantities and prices from 1995Q1 to 2001Q2 (i.e. just before the HP-Compaq merger
announcement). I concentrate on the top nine producers in the US market to match
each observation with more detailed product characteristics.23 The unit of observation is
dened as a manufacturer (e.g. Dell), brand (e.g. Optiplex), form factor (e.g. desktop),
processor type (e.g. Pentium II) and processor speed (e.g. 266 MHZ) combination. More
detailed information on the data construction can be found in the Appendix.
This dataset also provides unique information on the PC buyersidentity at an aggre-
gate level, distinguishing among the following segments: small o¢ ce, small, medium and
large business, government, education and home.24 This allows me to examine the Euro-
21IDC claims that it covers more than 80% of the US market.
22Various datasets from the IDC have been used both in economics (Foncel and Ivaldi, 2001; Van
Reenen, 2003; Pakes, 2003) and in management (Bayus, 1998; Bayus and Putsis, 1999, 2001).
23These manufacturers are: Acer, Compaq, Dell, Gateway, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, NEC, Sony and
Toshiba. Apple is excluded because IDC records its processors in a way that I was unable to match more
detail characteristics.
24According to IDC denitions a small o¢ ce is a non-residential business site with less than 10 em-
ployees. A small business is a business site with 10 to 99 employees, medium business with 100 to 499
employees and large business with 500 or more employees. The government includes city, county, state,
provincial, regional, military and federal governmental agencies. Education covers institutions such as
K-12, colleges, universities and trade schools. Finally, the home segment includes all home purchases,
regardless of usage (home o¢ ce, work-at-home or consumer applications).
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pean Competition Commissions claim that the various customer segments have di¤erent
purchasing patterns and whether the merger would a¤ect certain segments di¤erentially.
Hence, in my analysis I estimate the demand model both for the whole market and for
each of the three following segments: home, small business (including the small business,
small o¢ ce and medium business segments)25 and large business. These three segments
account for the majority (average 89%) of all PC sales. The largest is the home segment
(37%), followed by the small business (34%) and then the large business (17%).26
Despite the large number of small producers, the PC industry is rather concentrated
with the top ve rms accounting for 52% and the top ten rms for 72% of the aggregate
sales. Table 1 presents the average percentage shares of the nine rms included in the
sample. They account for 65% of total sales, 60% and 65% for the home and small
business segments respectively, reaching 80% for the large business segment. Tables 25
provide sales weighted means of the variables used in the specications, both for the overall
market and di¤erent segments. These variables include quantity (in units of 1,000), price
(in $1,000 units), "benchmark" (in units of 1,000), RAM (in units of 100MB), monitor
size and dummies for CD-ROM (1 if standard, 0 otherwise), internet (1 if modem or
ethernet included as standard, 0 otherwise) and desktop. The variable choice is based
on two criteria: rst, to capture technological innovation (i.e. the "benchmark" and
RAM) and trends in related markets (i.e. the modem/ethernet for internet and CD-ROM
for multimedia). Second, to be relevant both for the overall market and for the three
individual segments.
These tables reveal the remarkable pace of innovation and competition in this industry.
The quantity of products rises from 88 in 1995Q1 to 277 in 2001Q2, along an upward
trend. The core computer characteristics, "benchmark" and RAM, follow an amazing
average quarterly growth of 13% and 11% respectively. New components at the start
of the sample period, such as the CD-ROM and internet peripherals, that are installed
in 68% and 51% of new PCs respectively, di¤use quickly and are virtually standard by
the end of the sample period. Even more spectacularly, this fast technological progress
is accompanied by rapidly falling prices. In real terms, the sales-weighted average price
of PCs fell by 45% in the late ninenties.27 This combination of forces allowed portable
computers to become a¤ordable for more consumers, which can be seen by the negative
trend of the desktop market share. Finally, the tables reveal some interesting di¤erences
among the various segments. Large businesses, for example, buy more expensive PCs on
average, with better core characteristics and a stronger preference for portable computers.
They are slightly behind, however, in adopting peripherals.
25I calculate aggregate elasticities for each of these segments based on IV logit regressions. Small o¢ ce,
small business and medium business have very similar elasticities and for that reason, I combine them
in a single segment. I also experimented separating the medium business segment from the combined
small o¢ ce-small business segment. Results from either the IV logit or the random coe¢ cients model
conrmed their similarity.
26I exclude the government and education segments both because of their small market share and
because I could not nd reliable information regading their market sizes.
27There is an extensive empirical literature using hedonic regressions that documents the dramatic
declines in the quality adjusted price of personal computers. See, for example, Dulberger (1989), Gordon
(1989), Triplett (1989), Berndt, Griliches and Rappaport (1995) and Pakes (2003).
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4.2 Estimation
Demand model estimation closely follows Berry (1994) and BLP. The algorithm minimizes
a nonlinear GMM function that is the product of instrumental variables and a structural
error term. This error term is dened as the unobserved product characteristics, j, that
enter the mean utility. In order to compute these unobserved characteristics, I solve for
the mean utility levels, , by solving the implicit system of equations
(11) s (x; p; ; 2) = S
where s (:) is the vector of calculated market shares and S is the vector of observed
market shares. This nds the vector , given the nonlinear parameters 2, that matches
the predicted to the observed market shares. Berry (1994) shows that this vector exists
and is unique under mild regularity conditions on the distribution of consumer tastes. It
is numerically calculated using BLPs contraction mapping algorithm. Once this inversion
has been computed, the error term is calculated as j = j (x; p; S; 2)  (xj + pj).
Given a set of instruments, Z = [z1; :::; zM ], a population moment condition can be
written as E[Z 0()] = 0, where () is the above dened structural error term evaluated
at the true value parameters. Then, following Hansen (1982), an optimal GMM estimator
takes the form
(12) b = argmin

b()0ZA 1Z 0b(),
where b() is the sample analog to  () and A is a consistent estimate of the E [Z 00Z].
The intuition behind this procedure is straighforward. The structural residuals, de-
ned above, are the di¤erence between the mean utility and that predicted by the linear
parameters, 1 = (; ). The GMM estimator serves to minimize this di¤erence. At
the true parameter value , the population moment condition is equal to zero, so the
estimates would set the sample analog of the moments, i.e. Z 0b, equal to zero. If there
are more independent moment equations than parameters, the sample analogs can not be
set exactly to zero, but as close to zero as possible. By using the inverse of the variance-
covariance matrix of the moments, less weight is given to those moments with higher
variance. I calculate the weight matrix using the usual two-step procedure, starting with
an initial matrix given by Z 0Z. To minimize the GMM function I used both the Nelder-
Mead nonderivative search method and the faster Quasi-Newton gradient method based
on an analytic gradient.28
Finally, using the results in Berry, Linton and Pakes (2004), I increased the number of
simulation draws (more than ten times larger than the average number of products in my
sample) to obtain consistent and asymptotically normal estimators for the parameters. I
compute standard errors for the estimates using the asymptotic variance of
p
n
b   
given by
(13) ( 0 ) 1  0
 
3X
i=1
Vi
!
  ( 0 ) 1
28For more details see the appendix in Nevo (2000b).
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where   is the gradient of the moments with respect to the parameters, evaluated
at the true parameter values and approximated by its sampling analog. Three possible
sources of variance include: the process generating the product characteristics, V1, the
consumer sampling process, V2, and the simulation process, V3. V1 is given by the variance
of the moment conditions and approximated using its sampling analog. V2 is assumed to
be negligible given that the sample size is the US household population. Finally, to
account for the variance introduced by the simulation, I calculate V3 by bootstrapping
fty times the moment conditions to obtain an estimate of their variance across di¤erent
sets of simulation draws. As a result of the large number of initial draws, the error due
to simulation is minimal.29
4.3 Instruments
Identication of the population moment condition in (12) is based on an assumption and
a vector of instrumental variables. I assume that the unobserved product level errors are
uncorrelated with the observed product characteristics. In other words, that the location
of products in the characteristics space is exogenous.30 This is actually close to reality
since most R&D and most components built in PCs are produced by other rms, not the
PC manufacturers.
With respect to the instrumental variables, I experimented with various types that
have been suggested in recent literature. First, in the spirit of Hausman, Leonard and
Zona (1994), Hausman (1996), Nevo (2000a, 2001) and Hausman and Leonard (2002),
I used prices of the same PC models in Canada31 as instruments for US prices. Their
proximity and close trade relationships, implies that Canadian PC prices have the same
cost components as US PC prices and only demand factors would be di¤erent. Moreover,
such an instrument could be partially immune to the Bresnahan (1996) critique, since
aggregate shocks (such as a national advertising campaigns) that a¤ect the US demand
would be uncorrelated with the Canadian demand. The disadvantage of this instrument,
however, is the small cross-sectional variation (i.e. only one instrument for each price).
The second set of instruments directly follows the BLP approach. They used the
sum of the same observed characteristics of own-rm products and that of competing
rms. Given the previous exogeneity assumption, characteristics of other products will
be correlated with price, since the markup for each model will depend on the distance
from its nearest competitors. These instruments have been used successfully to study
many industries.
Lastly, I modify the previous instruments in the spirit of Bresnahan, Stern and Tra-
jtenberg (1997). They used as instruments functions of the observed characteristics,
29I do not correct for correlation in the distrurbances of a given model across time for two reasons:
First, because rm and processor generation xed e¤ects are included in the estimation. Second, because
there is a high turnover of products. The average PC life in my data is three quarters (see also Pakes,
2003, p. 1586).
30Endogenizing each rms decision of which products to produce conditional on its beliefs about what
other rms will produce and the state of future demand in a multidimensional di¤erentiated products
oligopoly is still an open research question and beyond the scope of this paper.
31Given that I examine only these top nine manufacturers, I was able to match each model with the
same model sold in Canada over the same period. The dataset on the Canadian models and prices is also
from the IDC. The prices were deated using the Canadian price index.
12
segmented according to their proposed clustering of the PC market during the late eight-
ies. My modication is simpler and closer to the competitive enviroment during the late
nineties: I calculate the sum of the observed characteristics of products o¤ered by each
rm and its rivals, conditional on the form factor of each computer. The intuition under-
lying this modication is that the price of a desktop PC would be more constrained by
the proximity of other desktops rather than a laptop, given their fundamental di¤erences
in functionality and technical characteristics.
5 Results
I turn now on the results from the demand estimation and their implications in terms
of markups and prot margins. I then assess the robustness of the specication used
to various pertrubations. Next, I simulate the e¤ects of the HP-Compaq merger and a
second, hypothetical, merger between Dell and Compaq. I analyze the mergerse¤ects
not only for the whole market, but also for the three customer segments individually. The
choice of the second merger is intended to demonstrate the variation in the di¤erential
segment e¤ects.
5.1 Demand Estimates
I use the logit model (i.e. ij = 0) to examine the importance of instrumenting the price
and test the di¤erent sets of instrumental variables. Table 6 reports the results obtained
from regressing ln(Sj)   ln(S0) on prices, characteristics and time xed e¤ect variables.
Columns 1 and 2 report ordinary least squares results. While column 2s rm xed e¤ects
inclusion is an improvement on column 1 (both the price coe¢ cient and the model t
increase), the majority of products are predicted to have inelastic demands (88.4% for
column 1 and 58.4% for column 2). This clearly counters reality.
To correct for the price endogeneity, I experiment with di¤erent instrumental variables
in the last ve columns. In column 3, I use Canadian prices of the same models. The
price coe¢ cient increases, as expected, but almost a quarter of all the products still
have inelastic demand. Columns 4 and 5 use the BLP instruments and my modied
instruments respectively, in conjuction with Canadian prices. Both the price coe¢ cient
and the proportion of inelastic demands remain una¤ected. When I use only the BLP
instruments in column 6, the coe¢ cient on price rises signicantly (leaving only 16.45%
of products with inelastic demands), but fails to correct for the negative RAM coe¢ cent
(implying that, ceteris paribus, consumers prefer lower to higher RAM) and the positive
desktop dummy coe¢ cient (implying that, ceteris paribus, consumers prefer a desktop
to a laptop). Moreover, the Hansen-Sargan overidentication test is rejected, suggesting
that the identifying assumptions are not valid.
The modied instruments alone seem to control the endogenous prices more e¤ectively,
as seen from the last column. The price coe¢ cient rises further, leaving no products with
inelastic demands. Moreover, the test of overidentied restrictions cannot be rejected at
the 1% level of signicance, despite the large number of observations. All other coe¢ cients
are statistically signicant with their expected signs. The "benchmark" is valued more
highly than RAM and the CD-ROM availability more highly than internet peripherals.
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The desktop dummy indicates that consumers attach greater value to laptop computers.
The only surprising result is the small negative coe¢ cient for monitor size.32 Finally,
the processor generation dummies33 indicate that each new CPU generation contributes
signicantly over the fourth generation, with the sixth generation contributing most. This
is probably due to the signicant improvements to PC hardware and software during
the sixth generation and the relatively short period since the introduction of the seventh
generation (the rst model appears in 2000Q1). Similar results regarding the instrumental
variable validity hold for each of the three market segments, but for brevity are not
reported here.
Table 7 reports the random coe¢ cient model results for the whole market. Column 1
replicates column 7 from the previous table to ease comparisons. Due to the di¢ culty of
the full model estimation and uniqueness of the PC market, a parsimonious list of random
coe¢ cients has been selected. As Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg (1997) suggested,
because of the modularity of personal computers and the ease with which consumers can
re-congure their machines, not all characteristics carry the same weight. For example,
consumers might choose a computer without a modem or CD-ROM as standard, not
because they do not value it, but because they can buy it later and possibly arbitrage any
price di¤erences. To the extent that consumers can easily re-congure PCs, I would not
be able to capture consumers heterogeneous preferences along these dimensions. Hence,
I focus here on random coe¢ cents for the "benchmark" and desktop variables. These
are essential characteristics for every computer and cannot be altered as easily as other
core characteristics (such as RAM or hard disk) or peripherals (such as the modem or
CD-ROM).
Full model results are in column 2. The random coe¢ cients are identied by observing
multiple markets with di¤erent distributions of the observed characteristics. Although the
sample period is short (only six and a half years), the pace of the PC industrys evolution
provides condence that I can identify these parameters. For the whole market, three
out of four coe¢ cients have Z-statistics greater than one. For the segment estimations
(Table 10 ), this is eight out of twelve. Moreover, each characteristic is estimated to
have a signicantly positive e¤ect either on the mean or standard deviation of the taste
distribution, with the constant the only exception. The magnitudes of the standard
deviations relative to their means suggest that there is signicant heterogeneity on price
and on the preferences for desktop computers. Most of the remaining coe¢ cients retain
their signs and signicance, as in the IV regressions.
The advantage of using the random coe¢ cients model stems from the more realistic
substitution patterns among PCs, which is important for the merger simulation. A small
sample of those elasticities is given in Table 8. In the top panel I present ve models mar-
keted by Acer in the rst quarter of 1995 along with their main characteristics. Markups
(in the last column) rise almost monotonically with price. This is in contrast to the logit
32This most likely stems from the introduction of more advanced and thinner monitors of the same size
in the last 2-3 years of the data. These are not recorded separately.
33In dynamic markets with frequent changes in the processors underlying technology, such as the PC
market, competition among products of the same CPU generation di¤ers signicantly from competition
with products of other generations. Applications of this idea in a standard hedonic framework can be
found in Pakes (2003) and Chwelos, Berndt and Cockburn (2004), where they use indicator variables for
CPU generations to estimate "piece-wise" stable coe¢ cients for the PC characteristics.
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model, which would predict a higher markup for the lower priced model. The bottom
panel reports, semi-elasticities (percentage change in market share for model i from a
$500 change in the price of j) of these ve models from the random coe¢ cents and IV
logit models. Most fundamentally, cross price elasticities are now driven by how close
models are in the characteristics space, rather than being equal as in the logit model.
One way to test the overall model implications is to compare the estimated percent-
age prot margins with observed values. Most of these multiproduct rms do not report
separate accounting measures for their PC operations. Even if they did, however, ac-
counting estimates of prot margins are known to be problematic.34 For that reason, I
rely on two surveys from the Financial Times that put gross prot margins of the top
PC manufacturers at 20% in 1996 and 10% in 1998.35 Table 9 summarizes the estimated
markups and margins for the di¤erent models. Markups derived from the OLS regression
are too high and imply that most brands have negative marginal costs. The IV regression
results predict a median markup of 19 percent, reaching 33 percent at the 90th percentile.
However, prot margins are more realistic in the random coe¢ cients model. The median
is 13.4 percent ranging well within the reported values from 10.36 in the 10th percentile
to 18.75 in the 90th percentile.36
Table 10 reports the demand analysis broken down by segments. The rst three
columns contain results for the home segment, the next three for the small business
segment and the nal three for the large business segment. Turning to the home segment
rst, a qualitatively similar pattern of results emerges to that for the whole market. The
coe¢ cient on price is biased towards zero in OLS (column (1)) compared to the IV logit in
column (2) by a large factor. This is true across all three segments. There is also evidence
in columns (3), (6) and (9) of random coe¢ cients on price and key characteristics that
are signicantly di¤erent from zero, leading Wald tests to reject OLS and IV regressions
in favour of the more exible model.
There is substantial variation in the estimated coe¢ cients between the three seg-
ments. Businesses seem to consistently have price coe¢ cients closer to zero (i.e. less
elastic demands) than households, whatever estimation method is used. The degree of
heterogeneity in the price coe¢ cient also seems greater among large businesses (1.79) than
small businesses (1.04) and households (0.88). Furthermore, businesses seem to place a
higher mean valuation on quality than do households (e.g. in the random coe¢ cients
specication the mean value of "benchmark" is over 2 for large and small businesses and
under 1.4 for home).
The di¤erences among the segments, however, become more meaningful, when looking
at the aggregate demand elasticities. Using the standard method of simulating a 1%
34See, for example, Fisher and McGowan (1983).
35"When prots switch o¤-line from performance: Despite record sales, PC manufacturers are strug-
gling on slim margins", Financial Times (10/2/1996). "The world PC market: Big name suppliers
tighten their grip", Financial Times (4/3/1998).
36My estimates fall between the other two papers that estimate a structural demand model for the
PC industry. Foncel and Ivaldi (2001), using quarterly data from IDC (without the additional product
characteristics) for the home segment from various industrialized countries during the period 1995-1999,
estimate a nested logit model and report a mean margin of 2.7% for the US in 1999. Goeree (2004) using
quarterly data from Gartner for the US home segment between 1996-1998 reports a median margin of
19% from her preferred model (see the discussion in the sensitivity analysis). Based on my estimates, the
mean and median margins for the home segment are 12.6 and 11.5 percent respectively.
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increase in the price of all models, I calculate aggregate elasticities for the whole market
and the three segments in Table 11. The upper panel presents the mean elasticities and
the lower panel the median elasticities from the IV logit and random coe¢ cients model.
Demand is overall more inelastic based on the random coe¢ cients model results. This is
due to random coe¢ cientsmore exible substitution patterns both for the inside products
and the outside good. A very consistent pattern of results emerges from both methods,
however: the home segment has the most elastic demand and the large business segment
the least elastic. For the random coe¢ cients model the di¤erence is about 1.8 to 1,
whereas for the IV logit it is 2.5 to 1. The small businesselasticity falls somewhere in
between the other two segments. This heterogeneity validates the European Competition
Commissions view about the di¤erences between home and business buyers. It also
indicates that personal computers were a necessity for businesses in the late nineties. The
rapid di¤usion of the internet together with developments in software and peripherals
made the PC an indispensable part of business life. In contast, households responded
more slowly to these changes and started to mimic businesses buying behaviour only
when PC prices had fallen dramatically. These ndings have direct implications of the
mergers e¤ects on di¤erent segments.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 12 presents the estimated markups and margins as a way to summarize the impli-
cations from three alternative specications. In the rst two columns, I replace the RAM
with the hard disk variable, leaving everything else unchanged. These variables (together
with speed) followed the same upward trend and so are highly collinear. Substituting
between the two characteristics hardly changes the previous results, with the mean and
median margin slightly lower at 13 and 12.4 percent respectively.
The second specication relates to Goerees (2004) model. She estimates a structural
model of PC demand for the US home segment using various data sources that cover
the top 10 manufacturers between 1996-98. She argues that due to the large number of
models, consumers have limited information with respect to available products. Therefore,
she emphasizes that models assuming full consumer awareness will generate inconsistent
estimates of product specic demand curves that are biased towards being too elastic. She
provides di¤erent predictions for the median prot margin across rms, with her preferred
specication at 19% and a baseline random coe¢ cients model at 5%.
Three comments are in order. First, compared to the market reality and given that
the home segment is more elastic than the other two segments, a 19% median margin is
more likely an upper bound. It is denitely not more realistic than the prot margin dis-
tribution for the whole market described previously. Second, Goeree uses a sophisticated
methodology, incorporating aggregate advertising information into an individual maximi-
sation framework. Her dataset, however, contains a restricted number of observable PC
characteristics,37 making the explanatory variables insu¢ cient to capture the observed
variation in market shares. That leaves a lot of variability for the advertising variables to
explain. Third, it is not clear how her instrumental variables perform in overidentication
37She does not use information related to the di¤erent processors, nor does she account for the di¤erent
CPU generations. Moreover, she lacks information on other core characteristics (such as RAM or hard
disk) and on important peripherals (like CD-ROM, monitor size, modem etc).
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tests and how they change in each model specication.
I lack the advertising data to test for Goerees "limited information" story. Columns
3 and 4 of Table 12, however, present results from a specication similar to her base-
line random coe¢ cients model.38 The limited set of explanatory variables produced a
higher value for products unobserved characteristics, j, and a higher aggregate elastic-
ity, which translated to lower estimated margins. The prot margin distribution, however,
is close to that obtained from my baseline model, even though parameter identication
is worse (only one in four random coe¢ cients was signicant). Therefore, this questions
whether Goerees model, despite its methodological contribution, provides any signicant
improvement over a basic random coe¢ cients model in terms of bringing the estimated
prot margins closer to reality.
The last specication of the table addresses recent criticism by Ackerberg and Rysman
(2004). They point out that standard discrete choice models (logit, nested logit, random
coe¢ cients logit etc) assume that one extra dimension is added to the "symmetric un-
observed product di¤erentiation" (SUPD) space with each new product in the market.
They argue, however, that in markets with more products, the unobserved characteristic
space should "ll up" in some sense and that standard models place strong restrictions on
how this occurs. Their calibration and empirical evidence suggest that failure to correct
for this lack of crowding, results in under-predicting elasticities and over-predicting gains
from new products. They propose ways to make standard models more exible, by intro-
ducing di¤erent functions of the number of products into the discrete choice estimating
equation.
In columns 5 and 6, I follow one of their proposed modications and include the
logarithm of the number of products in the market as an additional exogenous variable
(their "additive model") to my baseline model. The additional coe¢ cient is negative and
signicant in the basic IV logit, but insignicant in the random coe¢ cients model. More
importantly, the mean (17.3%) and median (16.3%) margins are slightly higher, implying
a more inelastic aggregate demand than the baseline model. Consequently, there is no
evidence that my baseline model under-predicts elasticities.
Note that Ackerberg and Rysman base their proposed correction on the assumption
that the unobserved characteristics space remains constant as the number of products in
the market changes. I believe that this assumption does not hold for the PC market in
the late nineties for two reasons: First, the increased variety in observed core character-
istics and the improved modularity o¤ered by PC manufacturers meant that computers
were di¤erentiated along important dimensions. This di¤erentiation was valuable to con-
sumers because they could nd more easily a PC to match their preferences. Second,
the continuous development of processors and the technological innovations in peripher-
als introduced di¤erentiation along new dimensions. Hence, even though Ackerberg and
Rysmans critisism remains useful, their proposed modication needs to be assessed at
every application.
38Observable characteristics include: price, speed, Pentium dummy, Desktop dummy, rm and time
xed e¤ects and random coe¢ cients on the rst four variables. As instruments I used my modied IVs,
based on speed, number of rival models and number of models with a Pentium processor.
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5.3 Merger Analysis
Using the structural demand parameters and the estimated marginal costs, I simulate the
postmerger equilibrium for the whole PC market. The upper panel of Table 13 presents
price and quantity changes39 both for the merger between HP and Compaq and the hy-
pothetical merger between Dell and Compaq, at three di¤erent periods. In line with
theoretical research on unilateral e¤ects, both mergers result in higher prices for all prod-
ucts in the market, smaller sales for the merging entity and larger sales for the non-merging
rms. Note also that any merger would raise prices more in 2001 than in 1998 or 1995.
In the HP-Compaq case, for example, the mean percentage price increase would be 0.58
in the rst period, 1.00 in the second and 1.11 in the third. The same e¤ect across time
is also true for the hypothetical merger between Dell and Compaq, with overall higher
induced mean price increases, reaching 1.87 percent in 2001.
The e¤ect of a merger on prices is a combination of the relevant strategic position of
the rms involved (portfolio of products, degree of di¤erentiation and market power) and
the aggregate demand elasticity. The impact on prices is higher in the second merger,
because the joint market power of Dell and Compaq is higher than that of HP and
Compaq at any point in time. Both mergers, however, raise prices more in 2001 than in
1995, because aggregate PC demand had become more inelastic. During the last decade,
the personal computer developed from an awkward and unfriendly tool for specialists into
an indispensable part of every day life. The HP-Compaq merger would have caused less
concern, in terms of its e¤ect on competition and consumer welfare, at the beggining
rather than at the end of the sample. Therefore, examining the di¤erential e¤ects of a
merger at various points in time, provides competition authorities with a sense of the
market dynamics that can be useful for any merger evaluation.
The equilibrium price and quantity changes assume that (marginal) cost conditions
remain the same before and after the merger. However, rms often advocate, both to
their shareholders and competition authorities, that cost e¢ ciencies can be achieved after
the merger. Since it is di¢ cult to predict the actual cost reductions, the lower panel of
Table 13 presents statistics on the following counterfactual: what would be the necessary
cost reductions such that the merger would have no e¤ect on prices? For the HP-Compaq
merger in 2001, for example, the average required cost e¢ ciency is 1.5 percent with the
maximum being 6.3 percent. Both are realistic. In fact, Ms C. Fiorina, the CEO of HP,
targeted an overall 5-7 percent cost reduction.40
The hypothetical merger between Dell and Compaq in 2001 would need a much higher
level of cost savings (2.5 percent on average, with a maximum of 10.3). The emerging pic-
ture is similar: larger cost decreases would be required over time to o¤set any postmerger
price increases. These results are complementary to those on prices and quantities and
provide another perspective on which a merger can be assessed.
The price and quantity results, although indicative, do not provide any criteria on
39It is worth noting, as Berry and Pakes (1993) mention, that the random coe¢ cient model is exible
enough that even though a price setting behavior is assumed, pairs of prices are allowed to act as strategic
complements or as strategic substitutes. In other words, what I nd is that when a merger raises the
prices of the merging rms, prices of the rivals went either way (although the majority of them, and hence
the mean and median, were positive).
40"HP lays the ground for $3bn savings", Financial Times (5/6/2002). "HP to hit cost cuts target a
year early", Financial Times (4/12/2002).
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which to judge the magnitude of these e¤ects. A structural model, however, can translate
these price movements into consumer welfare changes. Table 14 provides changes in
the consumer surplus, rms revenues and prots as a result of the various mergers.
Still focusing on 2001, two results regarding the HP-Compaq merger stand out: First,
the merger raises their combined protability ($1.86 million), despite a fall in revenues.
Second, the companies that benet most are Dell (with a $6.15 million increase in prots),
Gateway ($2.00 million) and IBM ($1.42 million). That matches reality well, where the
mergers critics, such as Mr. Hewlett, insisted that competitors like IBM and Dell stand
to gain the most from the merger: "HPs rivals raised almost no objections to the merger.
We are not surprised. We believe Dell, Sun and IBM must be delighted at the prospect of
a merger...".41 These results provide a clear explanation as to why the major competitors
did not complain about the merger: if the merged companies were to raise prices, these
rms would benet the most from such a strategy.
According to the estimates, the 2001 HP-Compaq merger would result in a $1.06
million loss in consumer surplus, but on a positive $11.67 million overall welfare gain.
These results are empirical support for the merger approval by both the US Federal
Trade Commission and the European Competition Commission. Sti¤ price competition
and the high degree of substitutability among PC manufacturers meant that the merged
entitys market power was not a signicant threat to competition. Finally, in line with
the previous results, a merger between Dell and Compaq would have been more harmful
to consumer welfare at any point in time.
Using the predicted postmerger prices for the whole market and the estimated demand
parameters for each sector, I calculate the merger e¤ects on each segment separately. Table
15 summarizes the predicted percentage changes in prices and quantities for the three
segments. Due to di¤erences in the underlying demand, the most striking phenomenon is
the wide variation on quantity responces among segments. For example, a similar increase
in prices from a 1995 merger between HP and Compaq (average percentage increase 0.61
for home, 0.58 for small and 0.55 for large), would have resulted in average percentage
quantity decreases of 7.26 for home, 4.61 for small business and 2.53 for large business.
The same is true for the Dell-Compaq merger, with amplied results. To a large extent
this phenomenon persists over time, indicating the heterogeneity in preferences among
the three sectors.
This price and quantity variation becomes more meaningful, when looking at the
predicted changes in consumer surplus and rmsvariable prots. Tables 16, 17 and 18
present these results for the home, small business and large business segments respectively.
The value of this cross-sectional analysis can be seen most clearly in the HP-Compaq
merger in 2001. Although results from the whole market indicated that the combined
rms protability would be positive, segment examination draws a more detailed picture:
the merger would be unprotable for the home (-$0.5 million) and the small business
(-$0.26 million) segments, with all of the gains coming from the large business segment
($1.80 million). This supports the view that the merger was a "defensive move"42 targeted
directly at the large business segment,43 rather than an attempt to monopolise the PC
41"Titanic failures", Red Herring (8/5/2002).
42"The HP-Compaq deal, which would consolidate the worlds second and third largest PC makers, is
thus best seen as a defensive move in a shrinking industry" The Economist (29/9/2001).
43"Fiorina (CEO of HP) and other HP executives insist that they must sell PCs to compete for lucra-
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market. Hence, from the rms point of view, this cross-sectional analysis provides a more
comprehensive picture of the strengths and weaknesses of a possible merger.
Segment analysis is also valuable from a public policy perspective. Consumer loss
from the HP-Compaq merger in 2001, for example, is much higher for the home segment
than for the other segments. This is not the case for all mergers across time. In the
hypothetical Dell-Compaq merger in 1998, the large Business segment has a negative
consumer surplus, which is larger than that of the other two segments. Total welfare
(consumer plus producer prots), however, is signicantly smaller in the home than in
the small or large business sectors. Given the size of the PC industry, these e¤ects across
segments would probably not change antitrust authoritiesoverall decision regarding the
HP-Compaq merger. In merger cases, however, where households are believed to be
more vulnerable than business buyers, knowledge of these di¤erential e¤ects can provide
regulators with valuable information on overall merger assessment.
6 Conclusion
Evaluating the e¤ects of a proposed merger has taken centre stage in debates on com-
petition policy. This paper contributes to this debate by examining how information on
the purchasing patterns of di¤erent customer segments can be used to more accurately
evaluate the economic impact of mergers. Using a detailed dataset that covers the lead-
ing PC manufacturers in the US during the late nineties, I evaluate the welfare e¤ects of
the largest merger in the history of the PC industry, that between Hewlett-Packard and
Compaq, along with a second hypothetical merger. I use a exible structural model to
estimate demand both for the whole market and for each of the three segments (home,
small business and large business). The postmerger oligopolistic equilibrium is then sim-
ulated under various assumptions. The di¤erential welfare implications of these mergers
are computed both across time and across segments.
Results from the demand estimation and merger analysis reveal that: (i) the random
coe¢ cients model provides a more realistic picture of the market than simpler mod-
els. This advances our knowledge for the performance of these models in di¤erentiated
oligopolistic markets with a large number of products. (ii) the demand specication is
found to be robust to various perturbations. This sample counters recent criticisms that a
random coe¢ cient model either over-estimates (Goeree, 2004) or under-estimates (Acker-
berg and Rysman, 2004) elasticities. (iii) despite being the worlds second and third
largest PC manufacturers, the merged HP-Compaq entity would not raise postmerger
prices signicantly in 2001. Ease of entry, strong price competition and the high degree
of substitutability among PCs meant that the merged entitys market power was not sig-
nicant to threaten competition. (iv) there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences
across segments that persists over time, and (v) the merger e¤ects vary signicantly across
segments.
Although consumer groups with di¤erent purchasing patterns have been recognised
in other industries as well, this is the rst study to systematically integrate them into
tive corporate customers" (The Boston Globe, 9/7/2003). Although personal computers provided lower
margins, they were perceived as a complimentary good to other products (such as servers or printers)
and thus formed an integral part of HPs strategy to compete for large business customers.
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a merger analysis. Analysing the di¤erential merger e¤ects by segments has important
implications for both rms and competition authorities. In the HP-Compaq case, for
example, an attempt from the merged entity to take advantage of its full product line
would result in negative prots in the home and small business segments, with more
than compensating gains from the large business segment. Hence, this analysis provides
rms with a more accurate picture of the merger, which can also be used for strategic
purposes. For example, rms can alter their product portfolio after the merger to match
the segments preferences more closely. The HP-Compaq evaluation also reveals that
the merger would harm home consumers more than business buyers. The magnitude
of consumer losses in this particular case would probably not change regulatorsoverall
decision. In mergers, however, where the welfare impact is stronger and households are
believed to be more vulnerable than businesses, knowledge of these di¤erential e¤ects
becomes very important for antitrust authorities. More research is required to examine
consumer segment heterogeneity and its consequences in other industries as well.
Future research also needs to address other dimensions related to postmerger equilib-
rium. Firms can a¤ect postmerger competition using a variety of non-price strategies,
such as advertising, R&D, new product development and brand life cycles. In addition,
a merger can trigger rm entry or exit decisions that can counterbalance changes in con-
centration. The empirical method used in this paper is not suitable to incorporate such
decisions. The dynamic framework of rm behavior developed by Ericson and Pakes
(1995) and its applications on mergers (Gowrisankaran and Town, 1997; Gowrisankaran,
1999) provides a basis to incorporate such dimensions and is promising for future research.
7 Appendix - Data Construction
Quarterly data on quantities and prices44 between 1995Q1 and 2001Q2 was taken from
the PC Tracker census conducted by the International Data Corporations (IDC). The
available dataset provided disaggregation by manufacturer, brand name, form factor,45
chip type (e.g. 5th Generation) and processor speed bandwidth (e.g. 200-300 MHz).
However, during the late nineties, there was a surge in the number and variety of new
processors, with Intel trying to achieve greater market segmentation by selling a broader
range of vertically di¤erentiated processors. In addition, the internet and the proliferation
of multimedia meant that PCs were di¤erentiated in a variety of dimensions that would
be essential to control for. For that purpose, I concentrated on the top nine manufacturers
in the US market (i.e. those who represented the majority of sales and for whom reliable
additional information could be collected).
Each observation in the IDC dataset was matched with more detailed product charac-
teristics from various PC magazines.46 To be consistent with the IDC denition of price,
44Prices are dened by the IDC as "the average end-user (street) price paid for a typical system
congured with chassis, motherboard, memory, storage, video display and any other components that
are part of an "average" conguration for the specic model, vendor, channel or segment". Prices were
deated using the Consumer Price Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
45Form factor means whether the PC is a desktop, notebook or ultra portable. The last two categories
were merged into one.
46The characteristics data was taken from PC magazines (PC Magazine, PC Week, PC World, Com-
puter Retail Week, Byte.com, Computer User, NetworkWorld, Computer World, Computer Reseller
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I assign the characteristics of the median model per IDC observation if more than two
models were available. The justication for this choice is that I preferred to keep the IDC
transaction prices, rather than substitute them with the list prices published in the maga-
zines. An alternative approach followed by Pakes (2003) would be to list all the available
products by IDC observation with their prices taken from the magazines and their sales
computed by splitting the IDC quantity equally among the observations. While, both
approaches adopt ad hoc assumptions, qualitatively the results would be the same. Both
list and transaction prices experienced a dramatic fall over this period and the increase
in the number and variety of PCs o¤ered would have been even more amplied with the
latter approach. Finally, instead of using the seventeen processor type dummies and the
speed of each chip as separate characteristics, I merge them using CPU "benchmarks"
for each computer. Hence, my nal unit of observation is dened as a manufacturer (e.g.
Dell), brand (e.g. Optiplex), form factor (e.g. desktop), processor type (e.g. Pentium
II), processor speed (e.g. 266 MHZ) combination with additional information on other
characteristics such as the RAM, hard disk, modem/ethernet, CD-ROM and monitor size.
The potential market size for the home segment is assumed to be the number of US
households (taken from the Current Population Survey). The small and large business
market sizes are the total number of employees as reported respectivelly in the Statistics
of US Businesses. I performed various robustness checks by reducing the market sizes or
by tting di¤erent di¤usion curves (not reported here). The results do not change in any
fundamental way.
8 References
Ackerberg, D. and Rysman, M. (2004) "Unobserved Product Di¤erentiation in Discrete
Choice Models: Estimating Price Elasticities and Welfare E¤ects", RAND Journal of
Economics, forthcoming.
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M. and Sta¤ord, E. (2001) "New Evideance and Perspectives
on Mergers", Journal of Economic Pespectives, 15, 103-120.
Baker, J. P. and Bresnahan, T. (1985) "The Gains from Merger or Collusion in
Product-Di¤erentiated Industries", Journal of Industrial Economics, 33, 427-444.
Bajari, P. and Benkard, C. (2004) "Demand Estimation with Heterogeneous Con-
sumers and Unobserved Product Characteristics: A Hedonic Approach", mimeo, Dept.
of Economics, Stanford University.
Bayus, B. L. (1998) "An Analysis of Product Lifetimes in a Technologically Dynamic
Industry", Management Science, 44 (June), 763-775.
Bayus, B. L. and Putsis, W. (1999) "Product Proliferation: An Empirical Analysis of
Product Line Determinants and Market Outcomes", Marketing Science, 18 (2), 137-153.
Bayus, B. L. and Putsis, W. (2001) "An Empirical Analysis of Firm Product Line
Decisions", Journal of Marketing Research, 38 (February), 110-118.
Berry, S. (1994) "Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product di¤erentiation",RAND
Journal of Economics, 25, 242-262.
Berry, S., Carnall, M. and Spiller, P. (1997) "Airline Hubs: Costs, Markups and the
Implications of Customer Heterogeneity", mimeo, Yale Economics Department.
News, InfoWorld, Edge: Work-Group Computing Report, Computer Shopper) and Datasources.
22
Berry, S. and Pakes, A. (1993) "Some Applications and Limitations of Recent Advances
in Empirical Industrial Oranization: Merger Analysis", American Economic Review, 83,
247-252.
Berry, S. and Pakes, A. (2002) "The Pure Characteristics Demand Model", mimeo,
Harvard University.
Berry, S., Levinson, J., and Pakes, A. (1995) "Automobile Prices in Market Equilib-
rium", Econometrica, 63, 841-90.
Berry, S., Linton, O., and Pakes, A. (2004) "Limit Theorems for Estimating the Para-
meters of Di¤erentiated Product Demand Systems", Review of Economic Studies, 71(3),
613-654.
Berndt, E., Griliches, Z. and Rappaport, N. (1995) "Econometric estimates of price
indexes for personal computers in the 1990s", Journal of Econometrics, 68, 243-268.
Boyd, J. and Mellman, K. (1980) "The E¤ect of Fuel Economy Standards on the
US Automotive Market: A Hedonic Demand Analysis", Transportantion Research, 14A,
367-378.
Bresnahan, T. (1996) "Comment: Valuation of New Goods Under Perfect and Im-
perfect Competition", In T. F. Bresnahan and R. Gordon, eds., The Economics of New
Goods. Chicago: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bresnahan, T. and Greenstein, S. (1999) "Technological Competition and the Struc-
ture of the Personal Computer Industry", Journal of Industrial Economics, 47, 1-40.
Bresnahan, T., Stern, S. and Trajtenberg, M. (1997) "Market Segmentation and the
Sources of Rents from Innovation: Personal Computers in the late 1980s", RAND Journal
of Economics, 28, S17-S44.
Cardell, N. and Dunbar, F. (1980) "Measuring the Societal Impacts of Automobile
Downsizing", Transportation Research, 14A, 423-434.
Caplin, A. and Nalebubu¤, B. (1991) "Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On
the Existence of Equilibrium", Econometrica, 59, 25-59.
Chwelos, P., Berndt, E. and Cockburn, I. (2004) "Faster, Smaller, Cheaper: An He-
donic Price Analysis of PDAs", Working Paper 10746, NBER.
Davis, P. (2000) "Empirical Models of Demand for Di¤erentiated Products", European
Economic Review, 44, 993-1005.
Deaton, A. and Muellbauer, J. (1980) "An Almost Ideal Demand System", American
Economic Review, 70, 312-326.
Dube, J. P. (2004) "Product Di¤erentiation and Mergers in the Carbonated Soft Drink
Industry", mimeo, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business.
Dulberger, E. (1989) "The Application of an Hedonic Model to a Quality Adjusted
Price Index for Computer Processors", in Jorgenson and Landau eds., Technology and
Capital Formation, MIT Press.
Ericson, R and Pakes, A. (1995) "An Alternative Theory of Firm and Industry Dy-
namics", Review of Economic Studies, 62, 53-82.
Fisher, F. M. and McGowan, J. J. (1983) "On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of
Return to Infer Monopoly Prots", American Economic Review, 73, 82-97.
Foncel, J. and Ivaldi, M. (2001) "Operating System Prices in the Home PC Market",
mimeo, University of Toulouse.
Genakos, C. (2004) "Product Life Cycles in the Personal Computer Industry", mimeo,
Economics Department, London Business School.
23
Genakos, C., Kühn, K. and Van Reenen, J. (2004) "The Incentives of a Monopolist to
Degrade Interoperability: Theory and Evidence from the Personal Computer and Server
Market", mimeo, London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance.
Goeree, A. S. (2004) "Advertising in the US Pesonal Computer Industry", mimeo,
Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, University of Amsterdam.
Goolsbee, A. and Petrin, A. (2004) "The Consumer Gains from Direct Broadcast
Satellites and the Competition with Cable TV," Econometrica, 72(2), 351-381.
Gordon, R. (1989) "The Postwar Evolution of Computer Prices", in Jorgenson and
Landau eds., Technology and Capital Formation, MIT Press.
Gowrisankaran, G. (1999) "A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Horizontal Mergers,"
RAND Journal of Economics, 30, 56 83.
Gowrisankaran, G. and Town, R. J. (1997) "Dynamic Equilibrium in the Hospital
Industry." Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6, 4574.
Hansen, L. (1982) "Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Es-
timators", Econometrica, 50, 1029-1054.
Hausman, J. A., Leonard, G. and Zona, J. D. (1994) "Competitive Analysis with
Di¤erentiated Products", Annales DEconomie at de statistique, 34, 159-180.
Hausman, J. A. and Leonard, G. (2002) "The Competitive E¤ects of a New Product
Introduction: A Case Study", The Journal of Industrial Economics, 3, 235-261.
Hausman, J. A. (1996) "Valuation of New Goods Under Perfect and Imperfect Compe-
tition", In T. F. Bresnahan and R. Gordon, eds., The Economics of New Goods. Chicago:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hendel, I. (1999) "Estimating Multiple Discrete-Choice Models: An Application to
Computerization Returns", Review of Economic Studies, 66, 423-446.
Ivaldi, M., Jullien, B., Rey, P., Seabright, P. and Tirole, J. (2003) "The Economics of
Unilateral E¤ects", Interim Report for DG Competition, European Commission.
Ivaldi, M. and Verboven, F. (2004) "Quantifying the E¤ects from Horizontal Merg-
ers in European Competition Policy", International Journal of Industrial Organization,
forthcoming.
Lancaster, J. (1971) Consumer Demand: A New Approach. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Langlois, R. (1992) "External Economies and Ecomic Progress: The Case of the Mi-
crocomputer Industry", Business History Review, 66, 1-60.
McFadden, D. (1973) "Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior", in
P. Zarembka, eds., Frontiers of Econometrics, New York, Academic Press.
McFadden, D. (1981) "Econometric Models of Probabilistic Choice", in C.F. Manski
and D. McFadden, eds., Structural Analysis of Discrete Data, MAss.: MIT Press.
McFadden, D. and Train, K. (2000) "Mixed MNL models for discrete response", Jour-
nal of Applied Econometrics, 15, 447-470.
Nevo, A. (2000a) "Mergers with Di¤erentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-
eat Cereal Industry", RAND Journal of Economics, 31 (3), 395-421.
Nevo, A. (2000b) "A Practitioners Guide to Estimation of Random Coe¢ cients Logit
Models of Demand", Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 9(4), 513-548.
Nevo, A. (2001) "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry",
Econometrica, 69, 307-342.
24
Pakes, A. (1986) "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding Euro-
pean patent Stocks", Econometrica, 54, 755-84.
Pakes, A. (2003) "A Reconsideration of Hedonic Price Indices with an Application to
PCs", American Economic Review, 93 (5), 1578-1596.
Peters, C. (2001) "Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from
the US Airline Industry", mimeo, Nortwestern University.
Petrin, A. (2002) "Quantifying the Benets of New Products: The Case of the Mini-
van", Journal of Political Economy, 110, 705-729.
Pinkse, J. and Slade, M. (2004) "Mergers, Brand Competition, and the Price of a
Pint", European Economic Review, 48 (3), 617-643.
Romeo, J. (1999) "Looking at Mergers the Way Federal Regulators Do", Journal of
Accountancy, December, 59.
Small, K. A. and Rosen, S. (1981) "Applied Welfare Economics with Discrete Choice
Models", Econometrica, 49, 105-130.
Song, M. (2003) "Measuring Consumer Welfare in the CPU Market", Working Paper,
School of Economics, Georgia Institutes of Technology.
Ste¤ens, J. (1994) New Games: Strategic Competition in the PC Revolution, Pergamon
Press, NY.
Triplett, J. (1989) "Price and Technological Change in a Capital Good", in Jorgenson
and Landau eds., Technology and Capital Formation, MIT Press.
Van Reenen, J. (2003) "Demand and Prices in theWork Group Server Market",mimeo,
London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance.
Werden, G. J. and Froeb, L. M. (1994) "The e¤ects of mergers in Di¤erentiated Prod-
ucts Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy", Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization, 10, 4017-426.
Werden, G. J. (1997) "Simulating Unilateral Competitive E¤ects from Di¤erentiated
Product Mergers", Antitrust, 11, 27-31.
25
FIGURE 1 - EVOLUTION OF PC QUALITY (CPU BENCHMARK) 
Notes: CPU benchmarks were obtained from The CPU Scorecard (www.cpuscorecard.com). They are 
numbers assigned to each processor-speed combination based on technical and performance characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 – MARKET SHARES  
Notes: Aggregate sales of PCs in the US market between 1995Q1 and 2001Q2. “Others” is a code given by IDC to small 
non-branded PC manufacturers. 
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FIGURE 3 – NUMBER OF PC MODELS AND AVERAGE PRICES 
Notes: Number of models (left axis) and average sales-weighted price (right axis) for the top nine PC 
manufacturers. Prices are deflated using the US Consumer Price Index. 
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TABLE 1 – SAMPLE MARKET COVERAGE 
   Average Percentage Unit Share 
Firm 
Whole 
Market 
Home 
Segment 
Small 
Business 
Segment 
Large 
Business 
Segment 
Acer 3.31 2.16 5.32 2.89 
Compaq 14.75 13.67 13.02 20.51 
Dell 12.65 3.96 15.81 22.71 
Gateway 7.61 10.52 5.28 3.92 
Hewlett-Packard 7.46 9.25 5.84 9.40 
IBM 7.37 4.51 9.49 10.80 
NEC 7.18 12.98 4.07 3.29 
Sony 0.74 1.23 0.67 0.18 
Toshiba 3.60 1.46 5.04 5.89 
Overall 64.66 59.74 64.53 79.58 
Notes: Numbers are average percentage firm market shares during 1995Q1-2001Q2 for the 
whole market and for each segment. 
TABLE 2 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE WHOLE MARKET 
          
Period No. of models Quantity Price Benchmark RAM CD-ROM Internet 
Monitor 
size Desktop 
1995Q1 88 28.701 2.410 0.140 0.103 0.678 0.513 12.050 0.815 
1995Q2 106 23.083 2.370 0.155 0.114 0.690 0.516 11.636 0.799 
1995Q3 112 27.673 2.222 0.176 0.130 0.784 0.578 12.390 0.839 
1995Q4 118 31.433 2.208 0.192 0.133 0.796 0.597 12.212 0.834 
1996Q1 127 25.287 2.285 0.221 0.142 0.847 0.604 12.376 0.813 
1996Q2 125 26.559 2.264 0.237 0.150 0.879 0.617 12.367 0.791 
1996Q3 124 32.358 2.260 0.264 0.158 0.931 0.665 12.930 0.786 
1996Q4 143 31.272 2.108 0.293 0.177 0.933 0.670 13.421 0.780 
1997Q1 160 24.719 2.116 0.363 0.219 0.931 0.643 12.169 0.773 
1997Q2 195 20.984 2.038 0.413 0.245 0.943 0.659 12.069 0.781 
1997Q3 222 22.629 1.998 0.476 0.277 0.977 0.711 11.336 0.792 
1997Q4 241 22.572 1.912 0.525 0.313 0.962 0.731 11.672 0.816 
1998Q1 245 19.502 1.939 0.609 0.375 0.941 0.783 12.189 0.817 
1998Q2 253 18.217 1.903 0.708 0.434 0.961 0.749 12.414 0.795 
1998Q3 250 22.883 1.801 0.792 0.489 0.968 0.770 12.898 0.802 
1998Q4 182 36.279 1.758 0.915 0.600 0.939 0.845 13.313 0.808 
1999Q1 156 37.409 1.674 1.051 0.724 0.944 0.812 15.058 0.811 
1999Q2 156 39.256 1.607 1.119 0.771 0.931 0.835 15.822 0.790 
1999Q3 136 48.581 1.536 1.259 0.857 0.941 0.889 16.083 0.791 
1999Q4 149 48.340 1.465 1.447 0.946 0.944 0.879 15.980 0.795 
2000Q1 203 33.184 1.411 1.753 0.958 0.982 0.869 14.060 0.797 
2000Q2 226 28.448 1.437 1.933 1.018 0.977 0.855 14.234 0.753 
2000Q3 237 32.061 1.381 1.995 1.016 0.978 0.875 14.267 0.752 
2000Q4 287 26.080 1.337 2.171 1.056 0.978 0.887 14.868 0.775 
2000Q1 249 24.715 1.324 2.390 1.103 0.980 0.871 15.069 0.765 
2000Q2 277 19.326 1.331 2.725 1.231 0.975 0.886 15.225 0.730 
ALL 4767 27.804 1.752 1.114 0.624 0.934 0.777 13.706 0.789 
Note: All entries in the last seven columns are sales weighted means. 
 
TABLE 3 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE HOME SEGMENT 
          
Period No. of models Quantity Price Benchmark RAM CD-ROM Modem 
Monitor 
size Desktop 
1995Q1 67 16.206 2.065 0.147 0.105 0.735 0.673 14.139 0.917 
1995Q2 78 11.614 1.992 0.161 0.113 0.765 0.681 13.995 0.891 
1995Q3 85 15.477 1.916 0.181 0.129 0.859 0.767 14.263 0.927 
1995Q4 87 19.069 1.929 0.197 0.134 0.867 0.787 14.196 0.926 
1996Q1 76 16.962 2.032 0.223 0.147 0.928 0.842 14.689 0.946 
1996Q2 82 12.720 1.996 0.231 0.148 0.929 0.808 14.545 0.920 
1996Q3 83 18.474 2.036 0.264 0.160 0.974 0.856 14.635 0.924 
1996Q4 92 19.611 1.729 0.291 0.174 0.988 0.892 15.040 0.955 
1997Q1 101 15.157 1.747 0.364 0.228 0.986 0.875 12.607 0.956 
1997Q2 125 10.517 1.641 0.393 0.238 0.991 0.900 13.265 0.944 
1997Q3 141 12.655 1.665 0.460 0.263 0.998 0.919 11.561 0.950 
1997Q4 153 13.882 1.663 0.521 0.306 0.997 0.908 12.971 0.967 
1998Q1 150 11.551 1.730 0.620 0.366 0.999 0.901 13.852 0.965 
1998Q2 163 8.674 1.702 0.731 0.443 0.999 0.867 13.703 0.961 
1998Q3 167 11.356 1.660 0.824 0.514 0.999 0.873 13.423 0.955 
1998Q4 134 18.841 1.575 0.933 0.623 0.998 0.849 13.132 0.930 
1999Q1 117 19.906 1.485 1.030 0.798 0.983 0.888 15.059 0.922 
1999Q2 119 17.462 1.395 1.125 0.886 0.941 0.914 15.538 0.887 
1999Q3 107 23.779 1.325 1.243 0.940 0.924 0.949 16.041 0.904 
1999Q4 114 29.071 1.278 1.425 0.978 0.923 0.914 16.231 0.902 
2000Q1 167 19.321 1.229 1.755 0.876 0.988 0.874 14.147 0.900 
2000Q2 169 14.631 1.226 1.891 0.938 0.981 0.860 14.674 0.857 
2000Q3 179 17.442 1.151 1.906 0.904 0.976 0.878 14.701 0.863 
2000Q4 199 16.198 1.112 2.112 0.988 0.973 0.861 15.688 0.886 
2000Q1 167 13.873 1.097 2.361 1.059 0.971 0.806 16.739 0.874 
2000Q2 195 9.285 1.122 2.727 1.221 0.959 0.798 16.799 0.828 
ALL 3317 15.494 1.504 1.118 0.627 0.957 0.863 14.602 0.913 
Note: All entries in the last seven columns are sales weighted means. 
 
 
TABLE 4 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SMALL BUSINESS SEGMENT 
          
Period No. of models Quantity Price Benchmark RAM CD-ROM Ethernet 
Monitor 
size Desktop 
1995Q1 88 11.010 2.576 0.135 0.100 0.643 0.085 10.737 0.754 
1995Q2 106 9.487 2.528 0.151 0.112 0.655 0.109 10.592 0.755 
1995Q3 112 10.543 2.400 0.172 0.128 0.741 0.115 11.312 0.783 
1995Q4 118 11.642 2.398 0.190 0.132 0.752 0.112 10.948 0.770 
1996Q1 127 9.864 2.389 0.218 0.139 0.789 0.131 11.060 0.736 
1996Q2 123 11.960 2.345 0.240 0.151 0.852 0.196 11.524 0.746 
1996Q3 119 13.389 2.374 0.263 0.157 0.905 0.204 12.125 0.714 
1996Q4 137 12.787 2.328 0.294 0.179 0.899 0.167 12.577 0.678 
1997Q1 153 9.844 2.312 0.361 0.214 0.898 0.068 12.072 0.669 
1997Q2 189 9.076 2.203 0.422 0.248 0.922 0.108 11.685 0.711 
1997Q3 214 9.235 2.143 0.482 0.282 0.966 0.158 11.326 0.709 
1997Q4 229 9.013 2.049 0.527 0.315 0.946 0.197 10.971 0.726 
1998Q1 231 8.185 2.031 0.598 0.375 0.918 0.319 11.454 0.739 
1998Q2 242 8.268 1.975 0.698 0.429 0.949 0.296 11.926 0.730 
1998Q3 242 10.091 1.864 0.776 0.473 0.956 0.349 12.783 0.721 
1998Q4 172 15.181 1.856 0.897 0.581 0.913 0.335 13.412 0.722 
1999Q1 154 13.706 1.791 1.062 0.677 0.922 0.321 15.011 0.727 
1999Q2 153 15.047 1.723 1.109 0.719 0.926 0.329 15.840 0.721 
1999Q3 136 17.252 1.672 1.263 0.811 0.950 0.297 16.033 0.704 
1999Q4 146 15.667 1.628 1.452 0.904 0.952 0.308 15.771 0.686 
2000Q1 200 10.536 1.571 1.722 1.008 0.986 0.323 14.325 0.683 
2000Q2 223 10.480 1.559 1.929 1.051 0.977 0.367 14.291 0.667 
2000Q3 233 11.496 1.535 2.040 1.086 0.980 0.390 14.354 0.657 
2000Q4 281 9.058 1.476 2.223 1.106 0.978 0.380 14.783 0.682 
2000Q1 241 9.045 1.436 2.399 1.137 0.980 0.415 14.757 0.681 
2000Q2 267 7.782 1.415 2.720 1.225 0.974 0.489 14.762 0.644 
ALL 4636 10.737 1.902 1.077 0.604 0.918 0.277 13.279 0.707 
Note: All entries in the last seven columns are sales weighted means. 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE LARGE BUSINESS SEGMENT 
          
Period No. of models Quantity Price Benchmark RAM CD-ROM Ethernet 
Monitor 
size Desktop 
1995Q1 74 6.365 2.839 0.133 0.105 0.616 0.127 9.936 0.708 
1995Q2 88 6.083 2.697 0.152 0.117 0.626 0.150 9.605 0.726 
1995Q3 93 6.484 2.541 0.172 0.133 0.705 0.155 10.416 0.757 
1995Q4 98 6.901 2.510 0.187 0.132 0.712 0.154 9.915 0.735 
1996Q1 104 6.439 2.550 0.221 0.138 0.799 0.187 10.388 0.703 
1996Q2 103 7.823 2.437 0.240 0.151 0.863 0.254 11.089 0.706 
1996Q3 99 8.946 2.441 0.266 0.157 0.905 0.279 11.426 0.674 
1996Q4 114 8.034 2.437 0.294 0.178 0.889 0.236 11.845 0.628 
1997Q1 129 7.116 2.409 0.363 0.213 0.896 0.091 11.596 0.637 
1997Q2 156 6.807 2.255 0.424 0.248 0.919 0.127 11.209 0.692 
1997Q3 181 6.979 2.210 0.489 0.287 0.963 0.177 11.035 0.698 
1997Q4 193 6.486 2.123 0.531 0.321 0.931 0.217 10.626 0.709 
1998Q1 204 5.660 2.101 0.609 0.388 0.892 0.378 10.898 0.723 
1998Q2 219 5.453 2.019 0.695 0.430 0.936 0.335 11.705 0.708 
1998Q3 215 6.428 1.885 0.775 0.483 0.947 0.417 12.382 0.734 
1998Q4 143 10.259 1.896 0.914 0.595 0.884 0.453 13.447 0.749 
1999Q1 131 10.657 1.810 1.069 0.670 0.914 0.436 15.128 0.755 
1999Q2 124 14.063 1.705 1.124 0.701 0.926 0.454 16.137 0.763 
1999Q3 113 15.190 1.663 1.279 0.796 0.955 0.446 16.213 0.741 
1999Q4 122 13.124 1.619 1.487 0.938 0.973 0.401 15.757 0.727 
2000Q1 152 9.228 1.592 1.792 1.073 0.963 0.384 13.461 0.731 
2000Q2 179 9.047 1.585 2.001 1.091 0.972 0.418 13.481 0.719 
2000Q3 194 9.266 1.554 2.085 1.109 0.977 0.440 13.385 0.703 
2000Q4 233 7.366 1.555 2.206 1.110 0.986 0.513 13.453 0.707 
2000Q1 197 8.413 1.493 2.417 1.120 0.993 0.517 13.143 0.721 
2000Q2 222 6.598 1.472 2.730 1.252 0.995 0.623 13.936 0.732 
ALL 3880 8.085 1.919 1.165 0.651 0.920 0.363 12.917 0.718 
Note: All entries in the last seven columns are sales weighted means. 
 
TABLE 6 – RESULTS FROM LOGIT DEMAND FOR THE WHOLE MARKET 
     OLS  IV 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Price -0.33** (0.030) 
-0.47** 
(0.031) 
 -0.69** 
(0.048) 
-0.68** 
(0.049) 
-0.70** 
(0.048) 
-0.78** 
(0.267) 
-2.74** 
(0.505) 
Constant -9.22** (0.177) 
-9.49** 
(0.187) 
 -8.89** 
(0.220) 
-8.91** 
(0.233) 
-8.87** 
(0.221) 
-8.64** 
(0.772) 
-3.08** 
(1.456) 
Benchmark 0.32** (0.088) 
0.32** 
(0.084) 
 0.44** 
(0.086) 
0.44** 
(0.082) 
0.45** 
(0.086) 
0.49** 
(0.176) 
1.61** 
(0.308) 
RAM -0.35** (0.090) 
-0.31** 
(0.089) 
 -0.16* 
(0.095) 
-0.16* 
(0.096) 
-0.15* 
(0.095) 
-0.09 
(0.207) 
1.28** 
(0.377) 
CD-ROM 0.09** (0.076) 
0.13** 
(0.077) 
 0.15* 
(0.079) 
0.15* 
(0.081) 
0.15* 
(0.079) 
0.16* 
(0.082) 
0.29** 
(0.120) 
Internet 0.22* (0.058) 
0.34* 
(0.055) 
 0.32** 
(0.055) 
0.32** 
(0.055) 
0.32** 
(0.055) 
0.31** 
(0.060) 
0.16* 
(0.088) 
Monitor Size -0.02** (0.005) 
-0.02** 
(0.005) 
 -0.02** 
(0.005) 
-0.02** 
(0.005) 
-0.02** 
(0.005) 
-0.02** 
(0.006) 
-0.05** 
(0.010) 
Desktop 0.62** (0.057) 
0.57** 
(0.056) 
 0.41** 
(0.062) 
0.41** 
(0.063) 
0.40** 
(0.062) 
0.34* 
(0.203) 
-1.12** 
(0.384) 
5th Generation 0.36** (0.111) 
0.33** 
(0.117) 
 0.38** 
(0.122) 
0.38** 
(0.131) 
0.38** 
(0.122) 
0.40** 
(0.139) 
0.89** 
(0.222) 
6th Generation 0.26* (0.149) 
0.27* 
(0.150) 
 0.47** 
(0.156) 
0.46** 
(0.161) 
0.48** 
(0.156) 
0.55* 
(0.285) 
2.35** 
(0.512) 
7th Generation 1.00** (0.263) 
0.97** 
(0.262) 
 1.05** 
(0.262) 
1.05** 
(0.286) 
1.05** 
(0.262) 
1.08** 
(0.274) 
1.79** 
(0.442) 
Firm Dummies no yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Fit/Test of Over 
Identification 
0.130 
 
0.229 
 
 - 
- 
31.39 
(16.81) 
63.61 
(20.09) 
31.24 
(15.08) 
18.064 
(18.47) 
1st Stage R2    0.461 0.4628 0.464 0.0166 0.0084 
1st Stage F-test    4043.8 777.2 452.68 210.2 5.02 
Instruments         
Canada prices    X X X   
BLP IV     X  X  
“Modified” IV      X  X 
Own price elasticity         
Mean -0.68 -0.99  -1.43 -1.42 -1.45 -1.61 -5.69 
Standard 0.29 0.42  0.61 0.60 0.62 0.69 2.42 
Median -0.64 -0.92  -1.33 -1.32 -1.35 -1.51 -5.32 
% of inelastic demands 88.44 58.38  23.79 24.29 22.74 16.45 0 
 Notes: The dependent variable is ln(Sjt)-ln(S0t). Based on 4,767 observations for the whole market. All regressions include time 
dummy variables. Asymptotically robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Z-statistic>1. ** Z-statistic>2. Adjusted 
R2 for the OLS regressions and the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentification for the IV regressions with the 1% critical values in 
parentheses. Canada prices are the prices of the same PC models in Canada; BLP IV are the sum of the values of the same 
characteristics of other products offered by the same firm, the sum of values of the same characteristics of all products offered by 
rival firms, the number of own-firm products and the number of rival firm products; “Modified” IV are the same as BLP IV, 
except that I condition on the form factor (see text for details). 
 
TABLE 7 – RESULTS FROM THE RANDOM COEFFICIENTS 
 MODEL FOR THE WHOLE MARKET 
    IV Random 
coefficients 
Variables (1) (2) 
Means   
Price -2.74** (0.505) 
-5.94** 
(1.386) 
Constant -3.08** (1.456) 
-1.24 
(4.190) 
Benchmark 1.61** (0.308) 
2.59** 
(0.967) 
RAM 1.28** (0.377) 
1.71** 
(0.732) 
CD-ROM 0.29** (0.120) 
0.32** 
(0.156) 
Internet 0.16* (0.088) 
0.11* 
(0.112) 
Monitor Size -0.05** (0.010) 
-0.06** 
(0.023) 
Desktop -1.12** (0.384) 
-5.14* 
(3.990) 
5th Generation 0.89** (0.222) 
1.35** 
(0.339) 
6th Generation 2.35** (0.512) 
3.84** 
(0.907) 
7th Generation 1.79** (0.442) 
2.25** 
(0.735) 
Standard Deviations   
Price 
 1.26** 
(0.604) 
Constant 
 2.50* 
(2.143) 
Benchmark 
 0.13 
(3.122) 
Desktop 
 3.88* 
(2.954) 
GMM Objective (df)  3.52 (3) 
Notes: Based on 4,767 observations for the whole market. All regressions include firm 
and time dummy variables. Asymptotically robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. * Z-statistic>1. ** Z-statistic>2. The first column is the same as column 
(7) in table 6. The second column presents parameters estimated via the two-step 
GMM algorithm described in the estimation subsection. The standard errors reported 
for the random coefficients take into account the variance introduced through the 
simulation by bootstrapping fifty times the relevant component of the variance in the 
moment conditions. 
 
 
TABLE 8 – SAMPLE OF ESTIMATED SEMI-ELASTICITIES 
       Model Form Brand Price Benchmark Sales Markup 
Acer Desk AcerPower 2,476 97 28,783 246.900 
Acer Desk AcerPower 3,382 272 7,196 323.280 
Acer Desk AcerPower 2,775 142 23,986 270.600 
Acer Desk Acros 2,506 97 25,154 249.180 
Acer Desk Acros 2,785 217 4,791 271.180 
 -210.097 
[-136.836] 
0.449 
[0.005] 
1.519 
[0.016] 
1.543 
[0.017] 
0.303 
[0.003] 
 
 1.794 
[0.020] 
-162.145 
[-136.851] 
1.895 
[0.016] 
1.609 
[0.017] 
0.380 
[0.003] 
 
 1.822 
[0.020] 
0.568 
[0.005] 
-192.317 
[-136.840] 
1.612 
[0.017] 
0.338 
[0.003] 
 
 1.765 
[0.020] 
0.460 
[0.005] 
1.538 
[0.016] 
-208.454 
[-136.838] 
0.307 
[0.003] 
 
 1.824 
[0.020] 
0.571 
[0.005] 
1.695 
[0.016] 
1.615 
[0.017] 
-193.264 
[-136.852] 
 
Notes: The upper panel of the table gives the sample of Acer models in 1995Q1 for which the semi-elasticities are 
calculated in the lower panel. Cell entries in the lower panel are indexed i,j, where i indexes row and j column. Semi-
elasticities are defined here as the percentage change in market share of i from a $500 change in the price of j. The first 
number in each cell provides the semi-elasticity calculated from the random coefficient model, whereas the second 
number is calculated from the IV logit model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 9 – ESTIMATED MARKUPS AND MARGINS FOR THE WHOLE MARKET 
     OLS Logit Instrumental Variable 
Logit 
Random Coefficient 
Logit 
Statistic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Median 2113.20 366.38 18.86% 250.38 13.39% 
Mean 2114.30 366.56 20.95% 269.59 14.11% 
10% 2109.40 365.70 11.61% 201.91 10.36% 
90% 2121.80 367.86 33.24% 355.46 18.75% 
Standard Deviation 4.64 0.80 9.39% 85.80 3.89% 
Notes: Columns (1), (2) and (4) give statistics for the estimated distribution of markups over the whole period 1995Q1-
2001Q2. Columns (3) and (5) provide statistics for the estimated distribution of margins. Margins are defined as markups 
divided by observed prices. All prices have been deflated using the US Consumer Price Index. 
 
TABLE 10 – RESULTS OF THE DEMAND ESTIMATION FOR THE DIFFERENT SEGMENTS 
     Home Segment Small Business Segment Large Business Segment 
 OLS IV Random  
Coefficients 
OLS IV Random  
Coefficients 
OLS IV Random  
Coefficients 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Means           
Price -0.76** (0.071) 
-5.07** 
(0.534) 
-6.410** 
(1.123) 
-0.36** 
(0.033) 
-3.09** 
(0.498) 
-5.831** 
(2.002) 
-0.30** 
(0.034) 
-1.58** 
(0.313) 
-5.771** 
(1.566) 
Constant -10.64** (0.327) 
1.28 
(1.529) 
1.284 
(1.944) 
-8.56** 
(0.199) 
-0.71 
(1.469) 
1.138 
(4.001) 
-9.56** 
(0.202) 
-5.83** 
(0.939) 
-6.008 
(6.654) 
Benchmark 0.27** (0.130) 
2.73** 
(0.346) 
1.372 
(1.523) 
0.26** 
(0.095) 
1.71** 
(0.294) 
2.714** 
(0.781) 
0.38** 
(0.097) 
1.12** 
(0.213) 
2.263** 
(0.799) 
RAM -0.08 (0.156) 
0.83** 
(0.255) 
0.755** 
(0.270) 
-0.34** 
(0.091) 
1.47** 
(0.392) 
2.083** 
(0.696) 
-0.42** 
(0.093) 
0.48* 
(0.254) 
0.615* 
(0.387) 
CD-ROM 0.04 (0.136) 
0.46** 
(0.184) 
0.377* 
(0.214) 
0.27** 
(0.076) 
0.28** 
(0.127) 
0.234* 
(0.170) 
0.28** 
(0.080) 
0.35** 
(0.100) 
0.340** 
(0.128) 
Internet 1.20** (0.079) 
0.83** 
(0.120) 
0.761** 
(0.125) 
0.14** 
(0.065) 
0.96** 
(0.195) 
1.314** 
(0.386) 
0.08* 
(0.070) 
0.32** 
(0.102) 
0.365** 
(0.182) 
Monitor Size -0.01* (0.008) 
0.02* 
(0.013) 
0.026** 
(0.013) 
-0.03** 
(0.007) 
-0.07** 
(0.012) 
-0.085** 
(0.019) 
-0.06** 
(0.007) 
-0.08** 
(0.009) 
-0.082** 
(0.018) 
Desktop 1.30** (0.101) 
-2.57** 
(0.493) 
-7.115* 
(4.159) 
0.24** 
(0.058) 
-1.96** 
(0.407) 
-8.568* 
(5.587) 
0.40** 
(0.064) 
-0.53** 
(0.233) 
-2.597* 
(1.500) 
5th Generation 0.34* (0.184) 
1.66** 
(0.321) 
1.808** 
(0.418) 
0.37** 
(0.118) 
1.05** 
(0.250) 
1.510** 
(0.481) 
0.29** 
(0.121) 
0.63** 
(0.182) 
1.207** 
(0.424) 
6th Generation 0.76** (0.238) 
4.69** 
(0.589) 
5.101** 
(0.745) 
0.30** 
(0.154) 
2.81** 
(0.523) 
4.433** 
(1.418) 
0.04 
(0.162) 
1.22** 
(0.342) 
2.673** 
 (0.899) 
7th Generation 1.79** (0.363) 
3.53** 
(0.614) 
3.609** 
(0.648) 
0.58** 
(0.279) 
1.90** 
(0.499) 
2.511** 
(0.863) 
0.02 
(0.291) 
0.58* 
(0.361) 
1.025** 
(0.511) 
Standard Deviations           
Price   
0.882** 
(0.444)   
1.042* 
(0.609)   
1.792** 
(0.712) 
Constant   
0.759 
(1.179)   
2.377 
(2.652)   
4.399* 
(3.810) 
Benchmark   
1.377** 
(0.647)   
0.051 
(1.885)   
0.102 
(5.285) 
Desktop   
4.374* 
(2.327)   
5.370* 
(4.003)   
2.555* 
(2.043) 
Notes: All regressions include firm and time dummy variables. Asymptotically robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Z-statistic>1. ** Z-statistic>2. Parameters for the random 
coefficients model are estimated via the two-step GMM algorithm described in the estimation subsection. The standard errors reported take into account the variance introduced through the 
simulation by bootstrapping fifty times the relevant component of the variance in the moment conditions. The internet dummy equals one if the PC includes as standard a modem (for the 
home segment) or an ethernet card (for the small and large business segments). 
 
 
TABLE 11 – ESTIMATED AGGREGATE ELASTICITIES  
     Whole 
Market 
Home 
Segment 
Small Business 
Segment 
Large Business 
Segment 
Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IV Logit 4.95 7.94 5.93 3.17 
Random Coefficients 3.94 4.70 4.17 2.62 
Median     
IV Logit 5.10 8.26 5.97 3.18 
Random Coefficients 3.94 4.84 4.20 2.49 
Notes: Aggregate demand elasticity is calculated as the percentage change in total market share from a one percent 
increase in the price of all products in the market. Results for the overall market and each segment separately are based 
on the estimated coefficients in Tables 7 and 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 12 – ESTIMATED MARKUPS AND MARGINS FROM ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
     Use Hard Disk instead 
of RAM 
Specification similar to 
Goeree’s random 
coefficients model 
Include  
ln(number of products) 
Statistic (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Median 233.73 12.37% 242.22 12.71% 293.71 16.28% 
Mean 244.77 13.05% 255.59 13.51% 356.56 17.28% 
10% 194.33 9.23% 197.07 9.81% 207.11 12.68% 
90% 304.79 17.78% 328.77 18.29% 541.89 22.28% 
Standard Deviation 54.09 3.82% 64.18 3.85% 380.15 7.87% 
Number of significant random 
coefficients variables 3 out of 4 1 out of 4 2 out of 4 
Notes: Columns (1), (3) and (5) give statistics for the estimated distribution of markups from the various specifications. Columns (2), (4) and (6) 
present statistics for the estimated distribution of margins. A random coefficients variable is considered significant if either its mean or standard 
deviation of the taste distribution is significant (see text for details). 
 
 
 
TABLE 13 – PREDICTED CHANGES DUE TO MERGERS IN PRICES, QUANTITIES AND MARGINAL COSTS 
       1995Q2 1998Q2 2001Q2 
  HP and 
Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
HP and 
Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
HP and  
Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
  %p %q %p %q %p %q %p %q %p %q %p %q 
Mean 0.58 -4.80 0.84 -6.72 1.00 -6.95 1.31 -8.67 1.11 -5.37 1.87 -9.00 Merging Median 0.48 -4.07 0.76 -5.54 1.06 -7.31 1.26 -8.66 0.60 -3.29 1.63 -7.59 
Mean 0.02 0.73 0.03 1.26 0.02 1.31 0.03 0.93 0.01 0.73 0.04 0.63 Non-Merging Median 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.42 0.01 0.49 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.20 0.02 0.13 
  %mc %mc %mc %mc %mc %mc 
Mean 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.5 2.5 
Median 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.4 0.8 1.9 
Max  2.1 2.0 2.9 3.0 6.3 10.3 Merging 
Min 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.4 0.6 
Notes: The top panel of the table shows the mean and the median percentage changes in prices and quantities of the merging and non-merging firms due to mergers at various 
points in time. The bottom panel presents statistics on the marginal cost reduction required for the postmerger prices to remain unchanged. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 14 – PREDICTED CHANGES IN VARIABLE PROFITS AND CONSUMER SURPLUS DUE TO MERGERS (in million of dollars) 
     1995Q2 1998Q2 2001Q2 
 HP and Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
HP and 
Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
HP and 
Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
Consumer Surplus -0.65 -1.14 -0.89 -1.79 -1.06 -2.01 
Average consumer 
surplus (in $) -0.0033 -0.0057 -0.0042 -0.0084 -0.0048 -0.0090 
 Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues 
Industry Total 5.64 -53.77 7.79 -62.68 12.05 -102.65 18.55 -190.93 12.73 -56.58 21.56 -183.02 
Acer 0.60 5.78 0.82 7.99 0.77 5.94 1.32 10.03 0.73 3.45 1.43 6.65 
Compaq 0.87 -35.60 1.18 -48.20 1.35 -82.50 1.60 -145.80 0.92 -57.00 0.01 -131.77 
Dell 0.72 6.53 -0.11 -67.24 3.65 23.70 1.76 -153.00 6.15 25.90 5.39 -126.60 
Gateway 0.81 7.04 1.12 9.95 1.89 13.85 3.20 23.03 2.00 9.18 3.95 17.88 
HP -0.15 -56.06 0.73 8.00 0.31 -93.13 3.65 25.20 0.94 -49.93 6.18 24.15 
IBM 0.92 7.61 1.29 10.82 1.57 12.05 2.62 19.57 1.42 8.10 3.17 17.82 
NEC 1.52 8.41 2.27 12.61 1.84 12.48 3.06 20.53 0.07 0.42 0.15 0.84 
Sony 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 1.61 0.31 2.74 0.34 2.32 0.84 5.43 
Toshiba 0.35 2.52 0.48 3.39 0.49 3.35 1.03 6.77 0.16 0.98 0.44 2.58 
             
Total Welfare 4.99  6.65  11.16  16.76  11.67  19.55  
Notes: Calculated changes in variable profits, revenues and consumer surplus as a result of the mergers. All numbers are in million of dollars, except for the average consumer surplus which is in 
dollars. Total welfare is calculated as consumer surplus plus profits. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 15 – PREDICTED CHANGES DUE TO MERGERS IN PRICES AND QUANTITIES FOR THE DIFFERENT SEGMENTS 
         1995Q2 1998Q2 2001Q2 
   HP and Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
HP and 
Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
HP and 
Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
   %p %q %p %q %p %q %p %q %p %q %p %q 
Mean 0.61 -7.26 0.84 -9.31 1.04 -10.69 1.34 -12.55 1.19 -5.84 2.45 -14.12 Merging Median 0.48 -4.49 0.76 -7.24 1.06 -8.63 1.45 -13.31 0.62 -3.43 1.72 -12.22 
Mean 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.48 0.02 0.77 0.03 0.66 0.01 1.70 0.03 2.58 Home Non-Merging Median 0.02 0.31 0.02 0.73 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.65 0.02 1.60 
Mean 0.58 -4.61 0.83 -6.46 1.00 -8.59 1.31 -9.76 1.12 -5.90 1.88 -10.45 Merging Median 0.48 -2.84 0.76 -4.22 1.06 -6.96 1.26 -9.61 0.60 -3.77 1.65 -7.99 
Mean 0.02 1.64 0.03 2.38 0.02 1.42 0.03 2.93 0.01 0.87 0.04 2.65 
Small 
Business 
Non-Merging Median 0.02 2.08 0.02 3.17 0.01 2.10 0.02 3.78 0.00 0.20 0.02 2.46 
Mean 0.55 -2.53 0.85 -4.23 0.97 -3.39 1.29 -4.64 1.00 -3.67 1.88 -6.12 Merging Median 0.48 -2.05 0.76 -3.26 0.99 -3.89 1.26 -3.84 0.53 -2.02 1.65 -5.40 
Mean 0.02 1.06 0.02 1.36 0.02 1.05 0.03 2.00 0.01 0.91 0.03 2.72 
Large 
Business 
Non-Merging Median 0.02 1.05 0.02 1.39 0.01 0.81 0.02 1.74 0.00 0.62 0.01 2.03 
Notes: Percentage changes in prices and quantities from mergers in different periods, calculated for the three different segments. Postmerger prices and marginal costs are taken from the whole 
market calculations.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 16 – PREDICTED CHANGES IN VARIABLE PROFITS AND CONSUMER SURPLUS DUE TO MERGERS (in million of dollars) 
FOR THE HOME SEGMENT  
     1995Q2 1998Q2 2001Q2 
 HP and Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
HP and 
Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
HP and 
Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
Consumer Surplus -0.17 -0.28 -0.36 -0.60 -0.71 -0.67 
Average consumer 
surplus (in $) -0.0017 -0.0028 -0.0035 -0.0058 -0.0067 -0.0063 
 Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues 
Industry Total 2.34 7.98 2.66 3.22 1.69 -45.03 0.89 -56.85 4.82 -29.59 5.44 -58.78 
Acer 0.07 0.54 0.12 1.06 0.12 0.90 0.12 0.86 0.12 0.50 0.13 0.54 
Compaq -0.22 -8.02 -0.33 -11.87 -0.65 -30.76 -1.99 -57.15 -0.24 -26.46 -2.40 -60.89 
Dell 0.03 0.18 -0.27 -8.38 0.36 2.33 -0.86 -23.74 2.40 11.29 -0.31 -33.45 
Gateway 0.16 1.05 0.27 2.14 0.87 6.39 0.88 5.79 2.29 10.87 3.58 16.61 
HP -0.12 -3.90 0.02 0.17 -0.93 -37.85 0.76 4.33 -0.26 -29.02 3.54 12.87 
IBM 2.03 17.44 2.13 18.19 0.42 3.30 0.43 3.17 0.09 0.49 0.16 0.84 
NEC 0.48 1.48 0.80 2.78 1.33 9.06 1.35 8.23 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 
Sony 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 1.60 0.19 1.66 0.39 2.54 0.67 4.29 
Toshiba -0.08 -0.79 -0.08 -0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.37 
             
Total Welfare 2.17  2.38  1.33  0.29  4.11  4.77  
Notes: Calculated changes in variable profits, revenues and consumer surplus as a result of the mergers. All numbers are in million of dollars, except for the average consumer surplus which is in 
dollars. Total welfare is calculated as consumer surplus plus profits. 
 
 
 
TABLE 17 – PREDICTED CHANGES IN VARIABLE PROFITS AND CONSUMER SURPLUS DUE TO MERGERS (in million of dollars)  
FOR THE SMALL BUSINESS SEGMENT 
     1995Q2 1998Q2 2001Q2 
 HP and Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
HP and 
Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
HP and 
Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
Consumer Surplus -0.19 -0.34 -0.16 -0.45 -0.15 -0.40 
Average consumer 
surplus (in $) -0.0036 -0.0065 -0.0030 -0.0082 -0.0026 -0.0069 
 Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues 
Industry Total 4.15 -17.04 5.56 -18.06 4.78 -41.14 9.72 -87.60 3.85 -12.14 8.26 -61.10 
Acer 0.42 4.24 0.62 6.28 0.64 5.04 1.37 10.67 0.50 2.38 1.32 6.24 
Compaq 0.46 -19.79 0.80 -25.21 -0.12 -42.73 0.35 -69.04 -0.16 -18.70 -0.49 -42.68 
Dell 0.59 5.58 -0.40 -39.21 2.46 16.60 0.54 -84.47 2.17 8.80 1.67 -53.90 
Gateway 0.49 4.51 0.71 6.67 0.91 6.86 1.93 14.54 0.48 2.21 1.30 6.04 
HP -0.29 -31.93 0.77 8.71 -0.76 -39.13 2.00 14.92 -0.10 -12.48 1.57 6.60 
IBM 2.16 18.86 2.41 21.05 0.91 6.98 1.86 14.03 0.74 4.20 2.16 12.15 
NEC 0.44 2.72 0.70 4.46 0.40 2.80 0.86 6.08 0.04 0.23 0.11 0.62 
Sony 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.70 0.33 2.17 
Toshiba -0.12 -1.23 -0.06 -0.81 0.34 2.44 0.81 5.67 0.08 0.52 0.29 1.66 
             
Total Welfare 3.96  5.22  4.62  9.26  3.70  7.86  
Notes: Calculated changes in variable profits, revenues and consumer surplus as a result of the mergers. All numbers are in millions of dollars, except for the average consumer surplus which is in 
dollars. Total welfare is calculated as consumer surplus plus profits. 
 
 
 
TABLE 18 – PREDICTED CHANGES IN VARIABLE PROFITS AND CONSUMER SURPLUS DUE TO MERGERS (in million of dollars)  
FOR THE LARGE BUSINESS SEGMENT 
     1995Q2 1998Q2 2001Q2 
 HP and Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
HP and 
Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
HP and 
Compaq 
Dell and 
Compaq 
Consumer Surplus -0.21 -0.38 -0.38 -0.65 -0.36 -0.91 
Average consumer 
surplus (in $) -0.0044 -0.0079 -0.0071 -0.0122 -0.0061 -0.0154 
 Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues Profits Revenues 
Industry Total 3.62 -3.03 4.18 -4.47 5.88 -13.77 10.19 -30.96 5.02 -8.05 13.65 -29.47 
Acer 0.06 0.54 0.09 0.88 0.16 1.23 0.31 2.33 0.12 0.59 0.33 1.56 
Compaq 0.54 -8.04 0.78 -9.89 1.64 -12.80 2.82 -23.12 1.02 -12.94 2.58 -27.99 
Dell 0.15 1.25 0.96 -15.83 1.34 8.48 3.97 -31.61 2.33 9.70 6.89 -23.50 
Gateway 0.07 0.53 0.10 0.83 0.27 2.00 0.52 3.84 0.12 0.56 0.33 1.58 
HP 1.11 -11.38 0.38 4.27 1.81 -17.10 1.17 7.92 0.78 -9.65 1.59 8.00 
IBM 1.85 16.11 1.92 16.69 0.35 2.37 0.72 5.08 0.54 3.07 1.60 8.89 
NEC 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.54 0.12 0.87 0.25 1.80 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.45 
Sony 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.44 
Toshiba -0.22 -2.19 -0.18 -1.96 0.18 1.19 0.43 2.80 0.05 0.33 0.18 1.10 
             
Total Welfare 3.41  3.80  5.50  9.54  4.66  12.74  
Notes: Calculated changes in variable profits, revenues and consumer surplus as a result of the mergers. All numbers are in millions of dollars, except for the average consumer surplus which is in 
dollars. Total welfare is calculated as consumer surplus plus profits. 
 
 
 
